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For decades following its establishment in the 1951 Treaty of 
Paris, the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) was studied largely, 
indeed almost exclusively, by legal scholars.1 During these years, 
 
 *  Professor of Political Science and Law, Jean Monnet Chair, Temple 
University, Department of Political Science. 
 1. See generally Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community 
art. 7, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter Treaty of Paris] (establishing 
the European Court of Justice as one of the four institutions of the European Coal 
and Steel Community). 
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lawyers both participated in and chronicled the development of ECJ 
jurisprudence, culminating in the so-called “constitutionalization” of 
the treaties and the establishment of a new legal order that permeated 
those of the individual Member States. More recently, drawing 
inspiration in part from legal scholarship and in part from the revival 
of the European integration process in the late 1980s, political 
science scholars “discovered” the ECJ and the process of European 
legal integration in the 1990s. This discovery produced a sort of 
golden age of law-and-politics research on the ECJ, its behavior, its 
interactions with Member governments and with national courts, and 
its role in the process of European integration broadly conceived.2 
Along the way, political scientists adopted some basic assumptions 
that informed nearly all of their analyses, engaged in theoretical 
debates that posed important causal questions and sharpened their 
respective analytical frameworks, and reached at least tentative 
empirical conclusions about the nature of the ECJ and its role in the 
European Union (“EU”) political system.3 
 
 2. The legal scholarship on the ECJ is, of course, too voluminous to cite. See 
generally, e.g., PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND 
MATERIALS (5th ed. 2011) (providing an overview of ECJ jurisprudence and EU 
legal scholarship); THE EUROPEAN COURT AND NATIONAL COURTS: DOCTRINE 
AND JURISPRUDENCE (Anne-Marie Slaughter et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter THE 
EUROPEAN COURT AND NATIONAL COURTS] (reviewing the dynamic between the 
European Court and Member State Courts); G. Federico Mancini, The Making of a 
Constitution for Europe, 26 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 595, 597 (1989) (arguing that 
national courts in Europe are indirectly responsible for the “boldest” decisions that 
the ECJ has ever made); Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a 
Transnational Constitution, 75 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (1981) (studying “the positions of 
the Commission [of the European Communities], the member governments and the 
Advocates General before the Court, and . . . the opinions of the Court itself”); 
J.H.H. Weiler, A Quiet Revolution: The European Court of Justice and Its 
Interlocutors, 26 COMP. POL. STUD. 510 (1994) [hereinafter Weiler, Quiet 
Revolution] (examining the ECJ’s role in European integration); J.H.H. Weiler, 
The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403 (1991) (positing that the ECJ’s 
interpretation of treaties has created an entity more closely resembling a federal 
state). 
 3. See generally Karen J. Alter, The European Court and Legal Integration: 
An Exceptional Story or Harbinger of the Future?, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
LAW AND POLITICS 209 (Keith E. Whittington et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter Alter, 
The European Court and Legal Integration] (assessing the legislative narrative, the 
international relations narrative, and the comparative politics narrative about the 
ECJ’s role in European integration); Lisa Conant, Review Article: The Politics of 
Legal Integration, 45 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 45 (2007) (placing legal integration 
in the context of legal scholarship, political science, and comparative politics); 
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Historians, in turn, “discovered” the EU and its history several 
decades ago, looking back at the origins of the Union, the negotiation 
of its founding treaties, and the political debates of its early years.4 
Yet, as Bill Davies and Morton Rasmussen have pointed out, this 
first wave of EU history focused almost exclusively on political and 
economic factors, and said little about the legal side of European 
integration or the role of the ECJ.5 The early years of EU legal 
integration, including such pivotal cases as Van Gend en Loos 
(1963)6 and Costa v. ENEL (1964),7 were therefore studied initially 
not by historians but by legal scholars, practitioners, and political 
scientists, who put forward compelling accounts but did not 
generally avail themselves of the type of archival resources consulted 
by historians of the EU.8  
That oversight has now been—or is starting to be—rectified, with 
the emergence of what I will call the New EU Legal History. In 
works like the August 2012 special issue of Contemporary European 
History titled “Towards a New History of European Law,”9 and in 
other recent works,10 a growing number of historians have turned 
 
Alec Stone Sweet, The European Court of Justice and the Judicialization of EU 
Governance, 5 LIVING REVS. EUR. GOVERNANCE 1 (2010) (taking the position that, 
as a trustee of the treaty system, the ECJ has instigated a Europeanization of 
Member States’ national law). 
 4. Primary-source historical research on the early history of European 
integration has grown dramatically over the past two decades, starting with the 
pioneering work of Alan Milward. See ALAN S. MILWARD, THE EUROPEAN 
RESCUE OF THE NATION-STATE (1992); ALAN S. MILWARD ET AL., THE FRONTIER 
OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY (1993); see also, e.g., FRANCES M. B. LYNCH, 
FRANCE AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY (1997); THE HISTORY OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION: ORIGINS OF A TRANS- AND SUPRANATIONAL POLITY 1950-72 
(Wolfram Kaiser et al. eds., 2011); ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION (Desmond Dinan ed., 2006). 
 5. Bill Davies & Morten Rasmussen, Towards a New History of European 
Law, 21 CONTEMP. EUR. HIST. 305, 310 (2012). 
 6. Case C-26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 
E.C.R. 1. 
 7. Case 6/64, Costa v. E.N.E.L., 1964 E.C.R. 585. 
 8. See, e.g., Alter, The European Court and Legal Integration, supra note 3, 
at 211–24; Stein, supra note 2, at 3 (admitting that the author consulted a “small 
sampling” of cases when constructing an account of European legal integration). 
 9. 21 CONTEMP. EUR. HIST. 305, 305–505. 
 10. E.g., BILL DAVIES, RESISTING THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: WEST 
GERMANY’S CONFRONTATION WITH EUROPEAN LAW, 1949-1979 (2012); PETER L. 
LINDSETH, POWER AND LEGITIMACY: RECONCILING EUROPE AND THE NATION-
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their attention to the archival record of the early years of European 
legal integration. This new historical focus has generated novel 
questions and provided important insights about long-standing 
disputes about the initial design of the Court by the Member States; 
about the nature and preferences of the Court and its judges; about 
the independence of those judges from the Member governments of 
the Union; about the allied yet ambivalent relationship between the 
Court and its counterparts in national legal systems; and more 
generally about the process of “constitutionalization” in which the 
EU created what Rasmussen calls “constitutional practice.”11 In a 
parallel development, a group of political sociologists led by Antonin 
Cohen and Antoine Vauchez has looked back at some of these same 
events, employing archives and other contemporary sources in an 
effort to re-create the social world of the Court, its judges, and its 
various interlocutors in the transnational European legal 
community.12  
My aim in this article is not to summarize this New EU Legal 
History in its entirety, but rather to ask, from the perspective of a 
political scientist, what is new—what value-added insights have 
emerged about the early Court vis-à-vis existing political science and 
legal scholarship—as well as what is still missing—namely, what 
important questions remain to be addressed by EU legal historians. 
The article, accordingly, is organized in four parts. First, I provide a 
brief summary of some of the primary themes of recent political 
science scholarship on the ECJ, identifying four primary questions 
and debates from that literature. Second, I look to the New EU Legal 
History, asking what genuinely new insights, if any, this historical 
scholarship has generated with respect to each of these four 
 
STATE (2010). 
 11. Morten Rasmussen, Establishing a Constitutional Practice of European 
Law: The History of the Legal Service of the European Executive, 1952−65, 21 
CONTEMP. EUR. HIST. 375, 395–96 (2012) [hereinafter Rasmussen, Establishing a 
Constitutional Practice of European Law] (describing the development of a 
“constitutional practice” instigated by the landmark ECJ decisions Van Gend en 
Loos and Costa v. E.N.E.L. as a progression toward a federalist legal structure 
stronger than any international organization). 
 12. See Antonin Cohen & Antoine Vauchez, Introduction: Law, Lawyers, and 
Transnational Politics in the Production of Europe, 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 75 
(2007); Antonin Cohen & Antoine Vauchez, The Social Construction of Law: The 
European Court of Justice and Its Legal Revolution Revisited, 7 ANN. REV. L. & 
SOC. SCI. 417 (2011). 
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questions. I argue that EU legal historians have indeed challenged 
some widely held assumptions in the political science literature and 
also helped to adjudicate among long-standing, and competing, 
theories of judicial politics and European integration. Third, I 
identify a series of potentially interesting and important questions 
that remain underexplored by legal historians, and I issue a plea for 
historians to engage these questions as well. A brief fourth section 
concludes. 
I. POLITICAL SCIENCE: RECEIVED WISDOM AND 
ONGOING DEBATES 
The political science literature about the ECJ over the past two 
decades is vast, theoretically and methodologically diverse, and in 
some instances riven by serious debates and divides among scholars 
about issues like the independence of the Court from the Member 
governments, or the nature of the Court’s relationship with national 
courts. The content of this literature has been well examined 
elsewhere,13 and so I focus selectively here on political scientists’ 
theoretical arguments and empirical findings on just four key 
questions: (1) the nature and preferences of the Court; (2) the 
independence of the Court from the Member States; (3) the 
relationship between the Court and its national counterparts; and (4) 
the process of constitutionalization of the treaties. My aim here is not 
to do justice to the complexity of the literature, but to establish a 
baseline of political science arguments and evidence against which 
we can assess the contribution of the new EU legal historians.  
A. THE NATURE AND PREFERENCES OF THE COURT  
The first of these questions, the nature and the preferences of the 
Court, is in some ways the most fundamental: What kind of actor is 
the European Court of Justice, and what does it want? Interestingly, 
however, neither of these questions has been a primary focus of 
empirical research for political science scholars, who, with a very 
 
 13. See, e.g., Alter, The European Court and Legal Integration, supra note 3, 
at 212 (examining legalist, international relations, and comparative politics 
scholarship relating to the ECJ and its position within the EU); Conant, supra note 
3, at 46–58 (providing a broad overview of legal and political scholarship relating 
to the EU’s legal system). 
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few exceptions, have contented themselves with untested 
assumptions about each of these two key points. 
With respect to the Court’s nature, nearly all political science 
analyses of the Court—whether qualitative or quantitative, 
neofunctionalist or intergovernmentalist, rationalist or 
constructivist—adopt the convenient and parsimonious assumption 
of treating the Court as a unitary actor, ignoring any potential 
differences among the judges.14 This is not a trivial assumption. It is 
of course well known to scholars of U.S. law and courts that 
individual judges often vote in strikingly and systematically different 
ways,15 and the ECJ itself has grown and become ever more diverse 
in recent decades,16 yet political science scholars have generally 
followed legal scholars in treating the ECJ as a unitary body.17 The 
reason for this is relatively straightforward: throughout its entire 
history, the ECJ has followed the lead of most European civil-law 
courts, deliberating in secret and issuing only a single per curiam 
decision of the Court, with no dissenting or concurring opinions and 
no indication of which judges voted in favor of or against the 
majority decision of the Court.18 Furthermore, individual judges have 
 
 14. See Antoine Vauchez, Keeping the Dream Alive: The European Court of 
Justice and the Transnational Fabric of Integrationist Jurisprudence, 4 EUR. POL. 
SCI. REV. 51, 52 (2012) [hereinafter Vauchez, Keeping the Dream Alive] 
(questioning the lack of “accounts as to how such a diverse group of 27 judges 
from different European countries with distinct legal traditions and professional 
backgrounds would spontaneously and continuously converge on what a ‘rational’ 
judicial decision means”). 
 15. See, e.g., M. Todd Henderson, From Seriatim to Consensus and Back 
Again: A Theory of Dissent, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 283 (2007) (analyzing the use of 
dissents in U.S. Supreme Court cases). 
 16. Presentation of the Members, COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7026/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2013). 
 17. As Vauchez writes, scholars “in the realm of political science have, so far, 
taken ‘the Court’ as their basic unit of analysis without ever questioning its very 
existence as one cohesive entity . . . . Although they may disagree about whether 
the ECJ is an agent of the Member States or a more independent and strategic 
actor, they assume the existence of a Court, analyzed in an anthropomorphic 
manner, that is, as a unitary and trans-historical collective with a clear-cut idea of 
its own interests in EU politics . . . .” Vauchez, Keeping the Dream Alive, supra 
14, at 52. 
 18. See Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Protocol 
on the Statute of the Court of Justice, art. 2, 29, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 
(requiring that deliberations occur in secret and that judges take an oath to preserve 
the secrecy of deliberations); id. art. 30 (requiring that judgments include the 
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strictly observed the formal and informal norm of deliberating in 
secret, providing scholars with few, if any, glimpses into the Court’s 
internal deliberations, the possible differences of opinion among the 
judges, or the degree of division or consensus among the judges on 
any given decision.19 Faced with such a closed court, both legal and 
political science scholars have made a virtue of necessity, treating 
the Court as a single body, ignoring the diversity of backgrounds and 
views of its judges, and imputing preferences to the Court as a 
whole.20 
This brings us to the question of the substantive or policy 
preferences of the Court. Here again, both legal and political science 
scholars are nearly unanimous in adopting a simple, parsimonious 
assumption about what the court wants. Specifically, most political 
scientists have adopted the assumptions of game theorists who posit 
a one-dimensional political space, bounded at one extreme by 
 
names of judges who deliberated but not requiring that their votes be recorded). 
 19. The EU legal system does feature another civil-law institution, that of the 
Advocate-General charged with preparing a draft opinion for the Court, from 
which the members of the Court (or, in contemporary practice, a significantly 
smaller panel of judges) are free to depart in their own ruling. The institution of the 
Advocate-General does arguably serve as a rough functional equivalent to a 
dissenting or concurring opinion, insofar as the Court may diverge openly from the 
suggestions of the Advocate-General, but it still leaves the observer guessing as to 
the size and identity of the deciding majority and dissenting minority, as well as 
the arguments and voting behavior of the judges during deliberation. NOREEN 
BURROWS & ROSA GREAVES, preface to THE ADVOCATE GENERAL AND EC LAW 
(2007); Michal Bobek, A Fourth in the Court: Why Are the Advocates-General in 
the Court of Justice?, 14 CAMBRIDGE Y.B. EUR. LEGAL STUD. (2012); Kirsten 
Borgsmidt, The Advocate General at the European Court of Justice: A 
Comparative Study, 3 EUR. L. REV. 106, 107 (1988); Alan A. Dashwood, The 
Advocate General in the Court of Justice of the European Communities, 2 LEGAL 
STUD. 202, 202 (1982); Cyril Ritter, A New Look at the Role and Impact of 
Advocates-General—Collectively and Individually, 12 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 751, 757 
(2006) (“The overall message is that the AG is not an entity ‘outside the Court’ but 
rather a Member of the court itself who offers his opinion in order that his 
colleagues arrive at the best legal solution.”). 
 20. As Vauchez writes, 
accessing the internal functioning of the Court . . . remains a far remote perspective in 
Luxembourg. The ECJ has not only remained strikingly silent about its decision-
making process (absence of dissenting opinions, non-publication of reports of 
hearings, etc.), but has also more generally maintained a strenuous secrecy concerning 
its internal functioning (non-disclosure of archive). It takes some shrewdness on the 
part of the researcher to circumvent such lack of access. 
Vauchez, Keeping the Dream Alive, supra note 14, at 58. 
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national sovereignty and at the other by supranational centralization 
of authority at the European level. The Court, like the supranational 
European Commission and European Parliament, is assumed to have 
preferences toward the supranational end of the scale.21 Put simply, 
legal and political science scholars have treated all of the EU’s 
supranational institutions as favoring “more Europe,” which implies 
both a transfer of power from the national to the European level and 
an augmentation of the institution’s own powers.22  
Among rational-choice scholars in political science, this 
assumption is deductive, posited as the premise of a model, but not 
subject to empirical testing. In the legal literature, by contrast, the 
claim that the Court is pro-integrationist is inductive, based on an 
extensive reading of the Court’s decisions and the off-the-bench 
writings of judges like Pierre Pescatore, who famously referred to the 
Court as having “une certaine idée de l’Europe.”23 Trevor C. Hartley 
summarizes much of this literature when he writes that: 
One of the distinctive characteristics of the European Court is the extent 
to which its decision-making is based on policy. By policy is meant the 
values and attitudes of the judges—the objectives they wish to promote. 
The policies of the European Court are basically the following: 
1. Strengthening the Community (and especially the federal elements 
in it); 
2. Increasing the scope and effectiveness of Community law; 
3. Enlarging the powers of Community institutions. 
 
 21. See Antoine Vauchez, The Transnational Politics of Judicialization: Van 
Gend en Loos and the Making of EU Polity, 16 EUR. L.J. 1, 15–16 (2010) 
[hereinafter Vauchez, The Transnational Politics of Judicialization] (highlighting 
the view that Van Gend en Loos became “the first arch of a bridge meant to 
entirely overcome the barrier between the sovereignties of the different Member 
States” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
 22. See Geoffrey Garrett et al., The European Court of Justice, National 
Governments, and Legal Integration in the European Union, 52 INT’L ORG. 149, 
155 (1998) (depicting the court as a sophisticated strategic actor, with “a clear 
institutional interest in extending the scope of Community law and its authority to 
interpret it”); see also George Tsebelis & Geoffrey Garrett, The Institutional 
Foundations of Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism in the European 
Union, 55 INT’L ORG. 357, 361–65 (2001) (reviewing studies on the role of 
supranational institutions in the creation of “more Europe”). 
 23. Pierre Pescatore, The Doctrine of Direct Effect: An Infant Disease of 
Community Law, 8 EURO L. REV. 155, 157 (1983). 
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These may be summed up in one phrase: the promotion of European 
integration.24 
Other legal scholars concur, with both advocates and critics of the 
Court painting a picture of an institution that has produced, from the 
early 1960s to the present, a consistently pro-integrationist body of 
jurisprudence.25 In short, a virtual consensus exists among otherwise 
diverse disciplines and otherwise hostile schools of thought that the 
Court should be studied as a unitary actor with a consistent, decades-
long preference for European integration. This consensus breaks 
down, however, when we turn to our next question, namely whether 
the Court is able to follow its preferences in the face of Member 
State opposition.  
B. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: COMPETING VIEWS  
For political scientists interested in explaining a policy outcome 
like the progress of European integration, the nature and preferences 
of the ECJ are of interest primarily insofar as the Court enjoys the 
ability to act on those preferences and advance the cause of 
integration beyond what the Member States would otherwise agree to 
undertake. This ability, in turn, relies on the Court’s independence 
from Member governments, for it was the Member governments that 
created the Court through the treaties, that appoint and reappoint the 
Court’s judges for renewable six-year terms, and that can overrule 
judicial decisions through new treaties or legislative acts.26 On this 
 
 24. “A certain idea of Europe.” T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 77 (2d ed. 1988). 
 25. See, e.g., HJALTE RASMUSSEN, ON LAW AND POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN 
COURT OF JUSTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLICYMAKING 3 (1986) 
(arguing that “the Court has, almost whenever possible, given priority to the 
necessity for a coherent and comprehensive European legal, social, economic and 
political order”); Pierre Pescatore, Les Travaux du “Groupe Juridique” dans la 
Négociation des Traités de Rome, 34 STUDIA DIPLOMATICA 159, 177–78 (1981) 
(“When, with a distance of 20, almost 25 years, we try today to take stock of what 
the Treaties of Rome have proven to be and how it has brought to life the European 
Community, we see that the practice has progressed and still progresses today by a 
small number of provisions: on one hand, the basic rules on free movement, non-
discrimination, competition . . . on the other hand the institutional apparatus, the 
legal system, the judicial system.”). 
 26. See Treaty of Paris, supra note 1, art. 32b* (“[The judges] shall be 
appointed by common accord of the Governments of the Member States for a term 
of six years.”); Garrett et al., supra note 22, at 150 (“[Governments] can also press 
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question of judicial independence, political science scholars have 
been deeply divided, with three primary schools of thought. 
The first of these schools is the intergovernmentalist approach, 
associated primarily with Geoffrey Garrett and his co-authors.27 The 
essential intergovernmentalist claim is that the ECJ is profoundly 
constrained by pressure from EU Member governments, who have 
the option to push back against the court in a variety of ways, 
including most notably the threat of unilateral non-compliance or 
legislative overruling of adverse ECJ opinions.28 These Member 
States, Garrett argued, had established the ECJ as a means to solve 
problems of incomplete contracting and monitoring compliance with 
EU obligations, and they rationally accepted ECJ jurisprudence, even 
when rulings went against them, because of their longer-term interest 
in the enforcement of EU law.29 In such a setting, the ECJ might 
identify “constructed focal points” among multiple equilibrium 
outcomes, but the Court was unlikely to rule against—and indeed 
was profoundly sensitive to—the preferences of powerful EU 
Member States.30 Carrubba, Gabel, and Hankla recently advocated 
this view, undertaking a quantitative analysis of ECJ decisions from 
several decades and positing that the threat of noncompliance and 
legislative overruling exerts a powerful constraint on the Court’s 
jurisprudence.31 
 
for the passage of new secondary EU legislation . . . or even revision of the EU 
treaty base . . . .”). 
 27. See, e.g., Geoffrey Garrett & Barry R. Weingast, Ideas, Interests, and 
Institutions: Constructing the European Community's Internal Market, in IDEAS 
AND FOREIGN POLICY: BELIEFS, INSTITUTIONS, AND POLITICAL CHANGE 173 
(Judith Goldstein & Robert O. Keohane eds., 1993); Geoffrey Garrett, 
International Cooperation and Institutional Choice: The European Community’s 
Internal Market, 46 INT’L ORG. 533 (1992) [hereinafter Garrett, International 
Cooperation]; Geoffrey Garrett, The Politics of Legal Integration in the European 
Union, 49 INT’L ORG. 171 (1995) [hereinafter Garrett, Politics of Legal 
Integration]; Garrett et al., supra note 22. 
 28. Garrett et al., supra note 22, at 150. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See Garrett & Weingast, supra note 27, at 181–85 (describing “constructed 
focal points” as institutions “that might provide the basis of a shared belief 
system”). 
 31. Clifford J. Carrubba et al., Judicial Behavior Under Political Constraints: 
Evidence from the European Court of Justice, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 435, 440–50 
(2008). But see Alec Stone Sweet & Thomas Brunell, The European Court of 
Justice, State Noncompliance, and the Politics of Override, 106 AM. POL. SCI. 
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A second view, at the other theoretical extreme, is offered by 
neofunctionalist theorists and by many legal scholars, who argue that 
the Court, as a legal body, is profoundly independent and largely 
unconstrained by EU member governments, which have generally 
been reduced to largely ineffective reactions against adverse 
(integrationist) legal rulings. In their neofunctionalist account of 
European legal integration, Anne-Marie Burley and Walter Mattli 
argued that the Court’s language of the law acted as both as a “mask” 
for the policy implications of the Court’s doctrinal interventions—
which were not immediately evident to the Member States—and as a 
“shield” against political attacks.32 In this view, landmark rulings like 
Van Gend, Costa, and the later Cassis de Dijon33 were the audacious 
acts of a highly independent court, to which Member States were 
largely powerless to respond.34  
In the most extreme articulation of this view of an unconstrained 
Court, Karen Alter has argued that the ECJ, as well as other 
international courts, should be thought of as the “trustees” of their 
Member States.35 Because the ECJ is a legal body, Alter argues,  
the venue and deliberative style in which interpretive politics takes place 
is very different from the negotiating table dominated by state actors. 
Courtroom politics take place in an environment highly constrained by 
law and legal procedure, where judges have a privileged position because 
they get to ask the questions, decide what is and is not relevant, and 
determine the outcome.36  
Under such conditions, efforts by governments to influence courts 
 
REV. 204 (2012) (arguing that Carrubba, Gabel, and Hankla’s data cannot support 
the claim that legislative overrule is a serious threat to the Court’s rulings). 
 32. Anne-Marie Burley & Walter Mattli, Europe Before the Court: A Political 
Theory of Legal Integration, 47 INT’L ORG. 41, 72–73 (1993). For 
neofunctionalists, the ECJ was also protected against Member State retaliation 
through its alliance with national courts, a point to which we shall return presently. 
See infra notes 52–54 and accompanying text. 
 33. Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für 
Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R. 649. 
 34. See Burley & Mattli, supra note 32, at 51 (noting that, in these decisions, 
the Court followed the lead of the Commission by pushing the Member States 
toward maximum integration, rather than following the positions of the Member 
States themselves). 
 35. Karen J. Alter, Agents or Trustees? International Courts in their Political 
Context, 14 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 33 (2008) [hereinafter Alter, Agents or Trustees?]. 
 36. Id. at 47. 
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through political pressure will be ineffective. Instead, states seeking 
to influence court decisions will be channeled toward either 
“rhetorical politics,” in which actors attempt to persuade judicial 
actors in the language of the law, or “legitimacy politics,” in which 
actors attempt to influence the public perception of the legitimacy of 
a court’s decision, or indeed of the court itself.37  
A third view, located between these two extremes, is that of 
principal-agent analysis, which conceives of the Court, and other 
supranational bodies such as the Commission, as the “agent” of 
Member State “principals.” Principal-agent scholars, like 
intergovernmentalists, see the Court as a creature of the Member 
States, which have delegated (and in some areas, such as criminal 
justice and foreign affairs, withheld) the authority to interpret EU 
law and to rule on member states’ compliance with it.38 The 
independence or discretion of the Court, in this view, is a function of 
the powers delegated to it, mitigated by the various control 
mechanisms available to the Member States, including the power of 
judicial appointment and reappointment, the possibility of legislative 
overruling of court decisions through new legislation or treaty 
revision, and ultimately the threat of noncompliance with Court 
decisions.39  
Principal-agent scholars have argued that the Court does indeed 
possess remarkable authority—at least within the traditional 
European Community “pillar” of the Union—and that the various 
control mechanisms available to the Member States are all difficult 
and costly to use.40 For example, the power of judicial appointment 
and reappointment provides Member States with potential influence 
over their own nominees to the Court, particularly because judges are 
susceptible to reappointment following their six-year terms. The EU 
 
 37. Id. at 35–36. 
 38. E.g., MARK A. POLLACK, THE ENGINES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: 
DELEGATION, AGENCY AND AGENDA SETTING IN THE EU 155–202 (2003) 
(examining the patterns of delegation of authority to the ECJ and the Court’s 
exercise of discretion). 
 39. E.g., id. at 156 (regarding the ECJ “as the object of the delegation rather 
than as a subject attempting to make use of its relatively large discretion to pursue 
its own agenda” (emphasis in original)). 
 40. See generally id. at 155−202 (analyzing the jurisdiction afforded the ECJ as 
well as the control mechanisms Member States can employ, namely appointment, 
legislative overruling, and unilateral non-compliance). 
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judicial appointment process is, however, radically decentralized, 
leaving each Member government the power to influence only the 
choice of its own nominee.41 ECJ judges, moreover, have guarded 
against the threat of Member State retaliation for adverse votes by 
adopting a strict rule of deliberating in secrecy and issuing only per 
curiam rulings with no dissenting votes or opinions. As for the threat 
of legislative overruling, principal-agent scholars point out that the 
barriers to such action are high, requiring either a qualified majority 
vote to adopt new secondary legislation or a unanimous vote and 
national ratification to adopt changes to the treaties.42 
Noncompliance, finally, remains a theoretical option for individual 
Member States unhappy with Court rulings, but it comes with 
reputational costs and can establish a harmful precedent for other 
Member States.43 The principal-agent view thus aligns with the 
trustee view in that both hold the Court up as an example of a 
remarkably powerful judicial body. The principal-agent approach 
sees the Court as not entirely unconstrained, however, because at the 
extremes the Court and its judges remain vulnerable to Member State 
pressures in response to its more audacious rulings.44  
 
 41. Id. at 166 (pointing out that, with this power, Member governments could 
appoint nationalist judges who are more opposed to integration, but surprisingly 
Member governments rarely exercise this option). 
 42. Id. at 172–74 (citing Tsebelis & Garrett, supra note 22, at 376–83). 
 43. Id. at 176–78 (explaining, for example, that even though the Court may not 
levy financial penalties for noncompliance, other political and reputational costs 
discourage noncompliance). 
 44. In addition to these control mechanisms, Lisa Conant has argued in her 
landmark book that Member governments can and frequently do contain the 
effects of ECJ decisions in various ways. Indeed, Conant argues that the national 
policy responses most often discussed by students of the ECJ (namely, overt non-
compliance, legislative overruling, and complete application of new legal rules as 
policy) are in fact the least common policy responses by Member governments. In 
addition to these three responses, Conant identifies three other possibilities that 
more accurately capture the individual and collective responses of Member 
governments to ECJ decisions: (1) “contained compliance,” which occurs when 
Member governments interpret ECJ rulings narrowly; “neglecting the policy 
implications of judicial decisions while simultaneously respecting individual 
judgments”; (2) restrictive application, which occurs when Member governments 
place limits and exceptions on judicial principles in domestic or European 
Community legislation; and (3) pre-emption, which occurs when Member 
governments “carefully construct European or domestic law to avoid future 
judicial interference in particular areas.” LISA CONANT, JUSTICE CONTAINED: LAW 
AND POLITICS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 15–49 (2002) [hereinafter CONANT, 
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The debate among these three theoretical perspectives on judicial 
dependence remains contentious, in large part because the internal 
workings of the Court are unclear and hence scholars need to rely on 
circumstantial evidence of Member State influence (or lack thereof) 
over the Court’s jurisprudence. To the extent that historical research 
helps to open the “black box” of the Court’s internal workings, it 
may help to adjudicate among these competing perspectives. 
C. THE ECJ AND NATIONAL COURTS 
We have thus far considered the Court only in relation to the EU’s 
Member governments, but the Court also enjoys a relationship with 
its other major interlocutors, namely national courts. The original 
Article 177 of the European Community Treaty, renumbered Article 
267 following the Lisbon Treaty, creates a “preliminary reference” 
procedure whereby national courts and tribunals, when faced with a 
question of European Community law, can request a preliminary 
ruling from the Court regarding (1) the interpretation of the Treaty, 
(2) the validity or interpretation of the acts of the Community 
institutions, and (3) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies created 
by the Council, where those statutes so provide.45 Any domestic 
Member State court may submit questions of European law to the 
ECJ for a preliminary ruling “if it considers that a decision on the 
question is necessary to enable it to give a judgment” on the case 
before it.46 Lower courts are not required to request preliminary 
rulings from the ECJ, but they are entitled to do so, and in practice 
the bulk of references comes from such lower courts.47 By contrast, 
where a question of European Community law is raised before a 
national court against which there is no possibility of appeal, that 
court must submit the question for a preliminary ruling by the ECJ.48  
The preliminary reference procedure is vital, as many of the 
Court’s landmark rulings—including Van Gend and Costa, which 
 
JUSTICE CONTAINED] (emphasis added). 
 45. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union art. 267, Sep. 5, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]; Treaty 
Establishing the European Economic Community art. 177, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 
U.N.T.S. 3. 
 46. TFEU, supra note 45, art. 267. 
 47. POLLACK, supra note 38, at 162. 
 48. TFEU, supra note 45, art. 267. 
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established the direct effect and supremacy of European Union 
law—originated as preliminary references from lower courts in the 
Member States.49 Furthermore, once the principles of direct effect 
and supremacy had been established, national courts continued to 
request preliminary rulings regarding the compatibility of national 
laws and regulations with the European Community and were willing 
to apply the ECJ decisions in specific cases. As Karen Alter points 
out, “the ECJ was asking national courts for nothing short of a legal 
revolution,” in which the latter would have to accept the supremacy 
of the European Economic Community Treaty over national laws 
and even national constitutions.50 Judicial review of national laws for 
conformity to European Community law would challenge 
longstanding notions of parliamentary sovereignty, and the 
established hierarchy of higher and lower courts would be disturbed 
by the addition of the ECJ as the authoritative interpreter of 
European Community law.51  
This raises an important question as to how national courts came 
to accept both the ECJ’s assertions of supremacy and direct effect 
and the Court’s subsequent tide of judicial rulings on a wide range of 
issues. Responses to this question again fall into three broad camps 
within the political science literature: the neofunctionalist “judicial 
empowerment view,” a related “inter-court competition” model, and 
what I will call the “sustained resistance” view.  
For neofunctionalists, the national courts’ willingness to accept 
ECJ jurisdiction and jurisprudence can be explained in terms of the 
extent to which ECJ rulings “empowered” national courts within 
their own domestic political and legal systems.52 In this view, 
national courts from European countries with weak or nonexistent 
traditions of judicial review benefitted from ECJ decisions that 
allowed such national courts to rule on the compatibility of national 
 
 49. Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 
E.C.R. 1 (direct effect); Case 6/64, Costa v. E.N.E.L., 1964 E.C.R. 585 
(supremacy). 
 50. Karen J. Alter, The European Court’s Political Power, 19 W. EUR. POL. 
458, 462 (1996) [hereinafter Alter, The European Court’s Political Power]. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See THE EUROPEAN COURT AND NATIONAL COURTS, supra note 2, at xii; 
Burley & Mattli, supra note 32, at 63; Walter Mattli & Anne-Marie Slaughter, 
Revisiting the European Court of Justice, 52 INT’L ORG. 177, 190 (1998); Weiler, 
Quiet Revolution, supra note 2, at 523. 
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laws with the supreme European Community law.53 Alternatively, 
judges with specific policy preferences would have an incentive to 
refer cases to the ECJ when they expected the resulting decision to 
be more in line with their preferences under European Community 
law than under the provisions of their own national laws.54  
In a subtle variant of the neofunctionalist account, Karen Alter 
examined the effects of inter-court competition on the acceptance of 
ECJ jurisdiction. She demonstrated that lower courts, whose judges 
stood to gain in various ways from a direct relationship with the ECJ, 
readily accepted the preliminary reference procedure and used it 
ambitiously.55 By contrast, Alter showed, national high courts in key 
countries such as France and Germany proved reluctant to refer 
questions of European Community law to the ECJ, notwithstanding 
their legal obligation to do so, and in some instances even attempted 
to quash lower-court references to the ECJ.56 Over time, however, 
ECJ doctrine filtered into the national legal orders through lower-
court decisions, and high courts were forced to accept the doctrines 
and the authority of the ECJ.57 National courts—once a significant 
constraint on the Court’s rulings—emerged as crucial partners of the 
 
 53. See, e.g., Weiler, Quiet Revolution, supra note 2, at 523 (“Institutionally, 
for courts at all levels in all Member States, the constitutional architecture with the 
ECJ signature meant an overall strengthening of the judicial branch vis-a-vis the 
other branches of government.”) 
 54. See, e.g., Jonathan Golub, The Politics of Judicial Discretion: Rethinking 
the Interaction Between National Courts and the European Court of Justice, 19 W. 
EUR. POL. 360 (1996) (examining how “the discretion to make or withhold 
references bestows on national judges the power to hasten or retard the pace of 
integration as well as to influence specific policy outcomes”). 
 55. Alter, The European Court’s Political Power, supra note 50, at 466 (noting 
that “[b]eing courts of first instance, lower-court judges were used to having 
another court hierarchically above them, and to having their judgments re-written 
by courts above” and that ECJ review allowed them to “circumvent jurisprudence 
of higher courts, and to re-open legal debates which had been closed, and thus to 
try for legal outcomes of their preference for policy or legal reasons”). 
 56. Id. at 465 (noting further that “high-court referrals to the ECJ are much 
more likely to be narrow technical questions about EC law—questions which do 
not allow the ECJ to expand the reach or scope of its jurisprudence”). 
 57. KAREN J. ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW: THE 
MAKING OF AN INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW IN EUROPE 55 (2001) [hereinafter 
ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW] (“In the few cases 
where high courts were able to quash a referral to the ECJ, it was because the 
decision to refer had been appealed to them. But usually the decision to refer a case 
to the ECJ is not appealed.”). 
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ECJ as the courts submitted an ever-growing number of cases to 
Luxembourg, allowing the Court to expand its jurisprudence. 
Member State courts’ acceptance of ECJ rulings also raised the costs 
of non-compliance for Member governments, which would defy not 
only the ECJ but their own national courts in the event of 
noncompliance with a Court decision.58  
Over the past decade, a third view has emerged in the political 
science literature, which one might call the “sustained resistance” 
view, in which national courts in various Member States do not 
accept ECJ jurisprudence and withhold submission of preliminary 
references to Luxembourg. Perhaps the best-known example of such 
national-court resistance is the decades-old judicial dialogue between 
the ECJ and the German Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal 
Constitutional Court) regarding the ECJ’s protection of individual 
rights, as well as its right to interpret authoritatively the EU’s legal 
competence vis-à-vis national constitutional orders. In the 1974 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, or Solange I, case,59 the Federal 
Constitutional Court indicated that, so long as adequate protection of 
human rights was not guaranteed by European Community law, it 
would reserve to itself the right to scrutinize European Community 
legislation for conformity to principles of fundamental rights 
enshrined in the German Basic Law.60 Responding at least in part to 
the reservations expressed by the Federal Constitutional Court, the 
ECJ subsequently developed its own legal doctrine applying the 
fundamental human rights common to the Member States to its 
judicial review of Community activities.61  
Following the development of this new ECJ jurisprudence, the 
German Court agreed in a second ruling, Solange II,62 to accept ECJ 
 
 58. See id. at 21–22. 
 59. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 
29, 1974, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 271, 1974 
(Ger.). 
 60. Id. at 275. 
 61. See Case 44/79, Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, 1979 E.C.R. 3729, 3744–
45 (recognizing that, in order for the Court to effectively safeguard fundamental 
rights, it must base decisions on the common traditions of its Member States); 
DAVIES, supra note 10, at 197–98 (explaining that external criticism of the Court 
encouraged the ECJ to focus on fundamental rights in a community framework). 
 62. Oct. 22, 1986, BVerfGE 340, 1986 . 
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decisions on fundamental rights without further review.63 Later, in 
the 1993 Maastricht decision,64 the Federal Constitutional Court 
again proclaimed its concerns about ECJ jurisprudence, this time 
regarding the extent of European Community competences, 
indicating that it reserved the right to review ECJ decisions for 
conformity to the provisions of the Basic Law.65 The debate over the 
compatibility of EU treaties with the German Basic Law has 
continued with additional challenges to the Lisbon Treaty66 and the 
recent Fiscal Pact.67  
Refusal to accept ECJ rulings, moreover, is not the only means at 
the disposal of national courts to resist unwelcome ECJ doctrines. In 
addition to overt resistance of the type seen in Solange I and 
Maastricht, national courts may also avoid unwelcome ECJ 
decisions by refusing to submit preliminary references to the Court, 
relying instead on previous ECJ decisions or on their own 
interpretation of the treaty provisions under the so-called acte clair 
doctrine.68 Finally, even where national courts agree to send 
 
 63. Id. at 387. 
 64. Oct. 12, 1993, BVerfGE 155, 1993. 
 65. Id. at 181, 191. See generally Matthias Herdegen, Maastricht and the 
German Constitutional Court: Constitutional Restraints for an “Ever Closer 
Union,” 31 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 235, 235–36 (1994) (documenting the broad-
reaching implications of the Maastricht decision). 
 66. See Armin Steinbach, The Lisbon Judgment of the German Federal 
Constitutional Court—New Guidance on the Limits of European Integration, 11 
GERMAN L.J. 367, 367, 389–90 (2010) (arguing that “gradual expansion of 
competencies to the EU, culminating in the Lisbon Treaty, induced the FCC—for 
the first time—to specify the core state functions that could not be handed over” 
and concluding that the “judgment clarifies the limitations of the transfer of 
competencies, even though the criteria used by the FCC cannot claim to produce 
the set of inalienable sovereign powers that were recognized as such throughout 
the Union”). 
 67. See Roland Nelles & Severin Weiland, A Setback for Germany’s 
Euroskeptics, SPIEGELONLINE (Sept. 12, 2012, 3:21 PM), 
www.spiegel.de/international/europe/constitutional-court-ruling-a-setback-for-
germany-s-euroskeptics-a-855413-druck.html (noting that, although the German 
Federal Constitutional Court ruled against the opponents of the Euro, it placed 
conditions on the fiscal pact and European Stability Mechanism, such as capping 
Germany’s liability at €190 billion). 
 68. As the ECJ has defined the acte claire doctrine: 
[T]he correct application of Community law may be so obvious as to leave no scope 
for any reasonable doubt as to the manner in which the question raised is to be 
resolved. Before it comes to the conclusion that such is the case, the national court or 
tribunal must be convinced that the matter is equally obvious to the courts of the other 
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preliminary references to the ECJ and accept its rulings, national 
courts still retain discretionary power to circumvent broader practical 
effects of ECJ case law by narrowly limiting application of ECJ 
decisions only to the particular case at hand.69 In all of these ways, 
the ECJ’s relationship with national courts, typically depicted as a 
vital resource for the Court in its conflicts with Member 
governments, serves as a constraint as well, limiting the Court’s 
ability to impose unwelcome judicial doctrines on reluctant national 
judges. Some of the best political science scholarship on the ECJ has 
focused on these tensions.  
D. THE ECJ AND CONSTITUTIONALIZATION 
Finally, political scientists as well as lawyers have taken a deep 
interest in the Court’s “constitutionalization” of the treaties and the 
apparently docile acceptance of this “judicial coup” by the Member 
governments. On this point, political science scholars have largely 
agreed amongst themselves, and with legal scholars, on the 
significance of the constitutional revolution of the 1960s, which in 
turn laid the groundwork for a series of additional integrative 
decisions by the Court in subsequent decades, and on the apparent 
passive acceptance of these revolutionary decisions among the 
Member States. Their interpretation of these events, however, has 
varied, most notably between neofunctionalist and 
intergovernmentalist scholars.  
 
Member States and to the court of justice. Only if those conditions are satisfied, may 
the national court or tribunal refrain from submitting the question to the Court of 
Justice and take upon itself the responsibility for resolving it. 
Case 283/81, CILFIT v. Ministry of Health, 1982 E.C.R. 3415, 3430; see also, e.g., 
Damian Chalmers, The Application of Community Law in the United Kingdom, 
1994−1998, 37 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 83, 103–04 (2000) (arguing that “British 
courts have not applied the doctrine as strictly as the Court of Justice suggested in 
CILFIT”); Golub, supra note 54, at 368–69, 379–80 (highlighting the use of acte 
clair doctrine by British judges to interpret environmental directives and 
recognizing that the doctrine of acte clair has the ability to empower national 
courts); Jens Elo Rytter & Marlene Wind, In Need of Juristocracy? The Silence of 
Denmark in the Development of European Legal Norms, 9 INT’L J. CONST. L. 470, 
491 n.83, 492 n.91 (2011) (elaborating on the frequent use of the acte clair 
doctrine by Danish and Swedish courts). 
 69. See CONANT, JUSTICE CONTAINED, supra note 44, at 79–94, 94 (discussing 
the enforceability of ECJ case law in national courts and concluding that 
“particularized” ECJ decisions have “narrowly confine[d] rights and obligations 
defined in the case law”). 
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For neofunctionalists, “the move to supremacy and direct effect 
must be understood as audacious acts of agency” by the Court,70 and 
the Member States’ failure to ignore or overturn landmark decisions 
to which they objected reflects the inherent difficulties of 
overturning the Court in its capacity as the authoritative interpreter of 
the treaties.71 For intergovernmentalists like Garrett, by contrast, the 
failure of the EU’s Member governments to overturn decisions like 
Van Gend, Costa, and the 1979 Cassis de Dijon ruling, establishing 
the principle of mutual recognition of standards, indicates that these 
rulings ultimately served the long-term interests of the EU’s most 
powerful Member States.72 Even where governments publicly 
contested the Court’s decision, intergovernmentalists argue, such 
contention may have been manufactured for domestic consumption 
by influential interest groups, concealing governments’ private 
satisfaction with the aggregate-welfare-enhancing effects of the 
increasingly effective European internal market.73  
Distinguishing between these two interpretations requires close 
primary-source research into the private motivations of national 
government officials. While political scientists have in many 
instances engaged in such research, they have typically relied on 
publicly available sources and not on archival sources documenting 
the internal, private actions and reactions of national government 
 
 70. E.g., Alec Stone Sweet & James A. Caporaso, From Free Trade to 
Supranational Polity: The European Court and Integration, in EUROPEAN 
INTEGRATION AND SUPRANATIONAL GOVERNANCE 92, 105 (Wayne Sandholtz & 
Alec Stone Sweet eds., 1998). 
 71. Stein, for example, conducted a survey of eleven landmark rulings of the 
ECJ during the heroic years of the 1960s and early 1970s. In ten of the eleven 
cases, he found, at least one Member government, and in some cases several 
governments or the Council as a whole, lodged a brief arguing against the 
constitutional extension being contemplated, while only a single case featured 
interventions by Member governments in favor of such an extension. Nevertheless, 
Stein found that the Court ruled in favor of an expansive reading of the treaty in all 
eleven cases. Stein, supra note 2, at 24–26. 
 72. See, e.g., Garrett, Politics of Legal Integration, supra note 27, at 172–73. 
 73. E.g., Garrett, International Cooperation, supra note 27, at 559 (noting the 
benefits that the Cassis de Dijon ruling provided for France and Germany). But see 
Karen J. Alter & Sophie Meunier-Aitsahalia, Judicial Politics in the European 
Community: European Integration and the Pathbreaking Cassis de Dijon Decision, 
26 COMP. POL. STUD. 535, 542–45 (1994) (offering considerable evidence of the 
extent of opposition to the decision among French and German government 
officials). 
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officials to landmark ECJ rulings.74 Here again is an area where the 
New EU Legal History promises to shed light on decades-old 
debates. It is to this new historical scholarship that we now turn. 
II. WHAT’S NEW IN THE NEW EU LEGAL 
HISTORY? 
The New EU Legal History is genuinely new, with a handful of 
scholars producing path-breaking historical research into the early 
history of EU legal integration only in the past few years. As 
historians, these scholars have aimed primarily to recapture, as far as 
archival sources allow, the deliberations and rulings of the ECJ in its 
social and institutional context. Particular areas of focus include the 
supranational European Commission and its Legal Service pressing 
consistently for an expansive, teleological reading of the treaties; an 
emerging community of European legal scholars superimposed on 
top of long-standing national legal professions; the national courts, 
which both sent preliminary references to and received and applied 
rulings from the Court; and the Member governments, which both 
delegated powers to the Court and were subsequently subject to its 
rulings.  
In some cases, these historical scholars have couched their 
narratives explicitly in terms of the hypotheses and claims put 
forward by legal and political science scholarship. In other cases, 
historians have simply presented a narrative of events of the 
formative years of European legal integration, eschewing any effort 
to test political science theories. Even here, however, the findings of 
their careful archival studies have the potential to inform, if not 
definitively test, the assumptions and hypotheses of political science 
scholarship reviewed in the previous section. We cannot claim too 
much for these studies in terms of hypothesis-testing, since in most 
cases the authors have engaged in analyses of particularly interesting 
or important episodes in EU legal history, rather than a 
representative sample of ECJ decisions or of Member State or 
national-court responses. Nevertheless, to the extent that they offer 
 
 74. Many political scientists have offered fine-grained analysis of the reception 
of particular ECJ decisions. See, e.g., ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF 
EUROPEAN LAW, supra note 57; CONANT, JUSTICE CONTAINED, supra note 44; 
Alter, The European Court’s Political Power, supra note 50. 
  
1278 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [28:5 
new, reliable, and qualitatively rich information about the internal 
workings of the Court and its interaction with its various 
interlocutors, these historical studies offer at least tentative tests 
allowing us to adjudicate among competing hypotheses, and propose 
new hypotheses, inductively informed by the Court’s historical 
practice. In this section, therefore, I engage in a selective, and 
opportunistic, effort to mine the New EU Legal History for lessons, 
asking how well existing political science claims hold up under the 
microscope of careful archival scholarship. I proceed thematically, 
looking at historians’ findings with respect to the four questions 
identified in the previous section. I begin with the very nature and 
preferences of the Court itself. 
A. THE NATURE AND PREFERENCES OF THE COURT:  
ASSUMPTIONS QUALIFIED 
Perhaps the most fundamental question to ask about the Court is 
the nature of the beast, yet the closed character of the Court, its 
absence of dissent and its secret deliberations, make this perhaps the 
most difficult question to answer, both for historians as for legal 
scholars and political scientists. Indeed, it is for this reason that both 
political scientists and lawyers fall back on the simplifying, and 
unrealistic, assumption that the Court is a unitary actor with a 
consistent preference for greater integration. EU legal historians have 
not been able to wave a magic wand at these problems, since the 
official archives of the Court remain closed to scholars, yet through 
careful sifting of personal and government papers from the period, 
Rasmussen and other legal historians have been able to shed some 
light on the nature of the early Court in particular. They have also 
been able to, if not falsify, then certainly qualify the two core 
assumptions at the heart of much political science and legal 
scholarship: the unitary nature of the court and its preference for 
European integration.  
First, with respect to the assumption of the ECJ as a unitary actor, 
Rasmussen’s scholarship in particular reveals that the unity of the 
early Court was in fact an illusion—but a useful one, from the 
perspective of a young institution. Second, in terms of the 
preferences of the Court, new scholarship leads us to question the 
assumption of a consistently integrationist Court. The scholarship 
demonstrates that the social construction, and reproduction, of an 
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integrationist Court employing a constitutional and teleological 
interpretive stance was not a foregone conclusion but required both 
time and effort to take hold.  
More specifically, new historical research has demonstrated that 
the origins of the ECJ’s revolutionary jurisprudence—namely, 
treating the Treaties of Paris and Rome not as traditional 
international treaties governed by traditional international law, but as 
the constitutional foundations of a new, federal legal order—can be 
traced to actors both before the establishment of, and external to, the 
newly established ECJ of the 1950s.75 Specifically, Rasmussen 
identifies as the key entrepreneur of this new conception of the EU 
legal order the Legal Service of the European Coal and Steel 
Community (“ECSC”) and later the European Economic Community 
(“EEC”), headed by its director, Michel Gaudet, during the crucial 
years of the 1950s and 1960s.76 Breaking with both the model of a 
traditional international court, and with that of a French 
administrative court that was most familiar to him, Gaudet explained 
as early as 1956: 
that he wanted the ECJ to assume a constitutional role similar to that of 
the US Supreme Court. This should be done by a teleological 
methodology of interpretation. Instead of relying on narrow textual 
interpretation in the tradition of international law, the ECJ should interpret 
the single treaty stipulations in light of the supposedly federal aims and 
spirit of the Treaty of Paris. This amounted to interpreting the treaty as if 
it were a constitution. To Gaudet, winning single cases was less important 
than convincing the ECJ to adopt this approach.77 
 
 75. See Rasmussen, Establishing a Constitutional Practice of European Law, 
supra note 11, at 376–77 (citing as an example the actions of Jean Monnet and 
Walter Hallstein in shaping the negotiation of the Treaty of Paris to include 
elements of a federal legal order). 
 76. Id. at 377 (stating that Gaudet served as the director of the Legal Service of 
the ECSC from 1958–1967 and director of the Legal Service of the EEC from 
1967–1970). 
 77. Id. at 379 (citing letter from Michel Gaudet to Donald Swatland (Dec. 31, 
1957) (on file with the Fondation Jean Monnet pour l’Europe, Lausanne)); see also 
Morten Rasmussen, The Origins of a Legal Revolution — The Early History of the 
European Court of Justice, 14 J. EUR. INTEGRATION HIST. 77, 85–86 (2008) 
[hereinafter Rasmussen, The Origins of a Legal Revolution] (recognizing that this 
kind of use of the Treaty of Paris served to strengthen the constitutional features of 
the ECJ, but also noting that the judicial tools available in the Treaty of Paris were 
too weak). 
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In the years that followed, Gaudet’s Legal Service would become 
the primary champion of what would in time become the ECJ’s 
signature teleological method of legal interpretation. It would also 
be, in the language of legal realism, the ultimate “repeat player” 
before the Court, consistently pressing, in case after case, a 
revolutionary new conception on a potentially reluctant Court.78  
A long-term, patient approach from the Legal Service would, 
moreover, be required, since the early Court of the 1950s was slow to 
take up a teleological, constitutional approach, as was the 
mainstream of the European legal community.79 Rasmussen 
identifies the “breakthrough” period as that between 1958 and 1965, 
when he argues that the Legal Service undertook a “double 
strategy.”80 First, it encouraged the development of national 
European law associations, which were brought together under Legal 
Service auspices in 1961 as the Fédération Internationale pour le 
Droit Européen (“FIDE”).81 FIDE would play an important role in 
facilitating test cases in the national courts, legitimizing decisions 
from the ECJ, and informing national legal communities of 
Community law developments.82 Second, the Legal Service 
determined, through its submissions regarding cases before the Court 
(and, after 1961, including preliminary references from national 
 
 78. See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on 
the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 95, 98–103 (1975) (documenting 
nine major advantages that “repeat players” have over “one-shotters”); see also 
CONANT, JUSTICE CONTAINED, supra note 44, at 17–18 (extending Marc 
Galanter’s notion of repeat players to ECJ jurisprudence). 
 79. See Rasmussen, Establishing a Constitutional Practice of European Law, 
supra note 11, at 380–82 (highlighting the obstacles faced by the Legal Service in 
trying to push a constitutional approach both inside the ECJ and before legislative 
bodies). 
 80. Id. at 383 (noting that Gaudet felt more optimistic given the new 
composition of the ECJ during this time period). 
 81. Id. at 384. 
 82. Id. (describing the importance of FIDE in the “double strategy”); see also 
Antonin Cohen, Constitutionalism Without Constitution: Transnational Elites 
Between Political Mobilization and Legal Expertise in the Making of a 
Constitution for Europe (1940s−1960s), 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 109, 130–31 
(2007) (attributing the success of these international laws to the use of national 
agents). See generally Alexandre Bernier, Constructing and Legitimating: 
Transnational Jurist Networks and the Making of a Constitutional Practice of 
European Law, 1950−70, 21 CONTEMP. EUR. HIST. 399, 404–07 (2012) (detailing 
the foundation and development of FIDE). 
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courts) to “prod” the ECJ toward a constitutional or teleological 
interpretation of the treaties.83 
Hence, when the Van Gend en Loos case was referred to the ECJ 
by a Dutch customs court asking whether Article 12 of the EEC 
Treaty enjoyed internal effect in the Dutch legal system, Gaudet’s 
Legal Service understood the potential constitutional significance of 
the case and presented an “audacious” position to the Court, arguing 
that “the legal nature of the Communities went beyond international 
law, and instead constituted a proper droit communautaire.”84 The 
provisions of the treaties, it continued, should therefore be addressed 
not simply to states, but should be given internal effect in the 
domestic law of the Member States, where they should enjoy 
primacy over contradictory national law.85 As a corollary of these 
new doctrines, the preliminary reference procedure of Article 177 
would be transformed, contrary to the clear intent of the Member 
governments, into a new mechanism whereby individuals could 
challenge the actions of their governments that ran counter to 
European law.86 Put simply, the Legal Service, supported by the 
College of Commissioners, was putting forward the essential 
positions for which not only Van Gend en Loos but also Costa v. 
ENEL would later become famous.  
In Van Gend en Loos, moreover, the Commission was asking the 
Court to rule against the explicit preferences of the Member 
governments, including two—Belgium and the Netherlands—which 
held that the ECJ had no jurisdiction in the case, and another—
Germany—which had previously been the great champion of the 
ECJ as a federal court but opposed in this case a new doctrine of 
 
 83. Rasmussen, Establishing a Constitutional Practice of European Law, supra 
note 11, at 383–84. 
 84. Id. at 387. 
 85. Id. at 388 (recognizing the importance of such a principle for the legal 
security of the citizens of each nation). 
 86. Id. (mentioning that such a new mechanism for enforcing European legal 
norms “crucially would supplement the infringement procedures articles 169–71”); 
see also Rasmussen, The Origins of a Legal Revolution, supra note 77, at 77 
(stating that this expansive reading of article 177 of the EEC treaty managed to 
ease access to European law for private litigants); Vauchez, The Transnational 
Politics of Judicialization, supra note 21, at 10–11 (analyzing Gaudet and FIDE’s 
extensive role in pushing for the broader interpretation of Article 177). 
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direct effect.87 Despite these objections, the Court went on to rule 
that the EEC was indeed a new type of legal order, and that Article 
12 of the Treaty was directly effective and created legally 
enforceable rights in the Member States.88  
Rasmussen’s research, however, suggests that the resulting 
decision of “the Court” was far from unanimous and was indeed 
swung toward the Commission’s position by the arrival at the Court 
of two new judges, the Frenchman Robert Lecourt and the Italian 
Alberto Trabucchi.89 In Rasmussen’s telling: 
During the deliberations the seven judges were split, voting narrowly (4 
against 3) in favor of granting Article 12 internal effects. The rapporteur 
of the case, Charles-Léon Hammers, promoted a ruling along the lines of 
international law, emphasizing the contractual nature of the treaty, a 
position apparently supported by [Judges] Riese and Donner. However, 
just when the ECJ seemed about to side with the member state position, 
the two new judges Trabucchi and Lecourt managed to turn the tide with 
two memoranda, which both favoured granting Article 12 direct effects. 
Trabucchi and Lecourt managed to bring Rino Rossi and Louis Delvaux 
to their side.90 
The Van Gend decision is of course only one episode, albeit a 
crucial one, in the history of the ECJ, and we lack similar 
information about the internal deliberation and voting in other 
landmark decisions like Costa and Cassis, among many others. At a 
minimum, however, Rasmussen’s revisionist history of Van Gend 
signals two very significant revisions to the existing assumptions 
about both the unity of the court and its specific preferences.  
On the question of unity, Rasmussen’s account does more than 
simply reveal that the court was not unanimous in its landmark Van 
Gend ruling. It also reveals the critical importance of the early 
decision—written into the Court’s statute and supported by 
subsequent practice—to issue only per curiam rulings and suppress 
all signs of dissent. We know from the history of the U.S. Supreme 
Court that, when handing down history-making decisions like 
 
 87. Rasmussen, Establishing a Constitutional Practice of European Law, supra 
note 11, at 388. 
 88. See id. at 390 (dissecting the two core elements of the Court’s holding). 
 89. Id. at 389–90. 
 90. Id. at 389. 
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Marbury v. Madison91 and Brown v. Board of Education,92 it has 
striven for, and sometimes reached, a unanimous decision in the 
belief that the unanimity of the justices lent greater weight and 
conferred greater legitimacy on these landmark rulings in the face of 
predictable opposition from the other branches of government or 
from public opinion.93 By contrast, important decisions adopted by a 
divided vote are often seen as weakening the legitimacy of both the 
ruling and the Court as a whole. In the words of Judge Learned 
Hand, a dissenting opinion in such a case “cancels the impact of 
monolithic solidarity on which the authority of a bench of judges so 
largely depends.”94 For this reason, chief justices from John Marshall 
to John Roberts have sought unanimity wherever possible, 
particularly for important decisions.95  
In issuing Van Gend, and indeed all its other rulings, as a per 
curiam decision of the entire Court, the judges presented the façade 
of unanimity by suppressing all evidence of internal dissent and lent 
the Court’s ruling greater weight and legitimacy. It thereby reduced 
or eliminated the prospect that Member States would be able to 
single out individual judges for retribution (through non-renewal of 
their six-year terms) for taking bold integrationist decisions. 
Counterfactually, it is instructive to ask how Van Gend and other 
critical rulings might have been received in national capitals had it 
 
 91. 5 U.S. 137 (1801). 
 92. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 93. See generally M. Todd Henderson, From Seriatim to Consensus and Back 
Again: A Theory of Dissent, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 283 (2007) (discussing the value 
of dissenting opinions and the “common refrain in American constitutional 
history” that the Supreme Court is “more efficient at deciding cases and making 
law, if it spoke with one voice”). 
 94. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 72 (1958). 
 95. The relationship between unanimous rulings, dissent, and judicial 
legitimacy is a complicated one. See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense 
of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 438, 673 (1986) (discussing the constructive 
role of dissents and concluding that voicing a dissent is an “obligation that all of 
us, as American citizens have, and that judges, as adjudicators, particularly feel, is 
to speak up when we are convinced that the fundamental law of our Constitution 
requires a given result”); Henderson, supra note 93, at 337–38 (reasoning that 
unanimity and the use of dissents can both be tools to achieve public acceptance); 
Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice: Dissent, Legal 
Scholarship, and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1267, 1380–
82 (2001) (explaining that unanimity resembles the autonomous model of law, 
while allowing dissents within the Court is more similar to the responsive model). 
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been known that this weightiest of rulings had been adopted by a 
bare majority over the objections of a sizable minority of judges—
that a single vote had started a legal revolution and undermined 
national sovereignty for decades to come. And it is provocative to 
ask—although we may never know the answer—which other 
landmark ECJ rulings were, behind the closed doors of the Kirchberg 
Plateau, equally split decisions. What is clear is that the unity of the 
Court in this case was indeed an illusion, but a useful one, which 
arguably lent greater authority and weight to the decisions of a new 
and little-known court at a critical juncture. 
Second, with respect to the substantive preferences of the judges, 
Rasmussen as well as other scholars like Cohen and Vauchez—who 
have undertaken systematic research into the professional 
backgrounds of the early judges—demonstrate that the early Court 
was far from uniformly integrationist.96 A majority of the early 
Court, indeed, conceived of the treaties essentially as an international 
legal contract binding only upon its Member State parties, to be read 
in a close textual fashion rather than a broad teleological one, and in 
which the Court was to serve primarily as an administrative rather 
than constitutional organ.97 The establishment of an integrationist 
majority—willing to adopt a new teleological interpretation of the 
Court, to treat the treaties as a de facto constitution, and to put in 
place the key doctrines of direct effect and supremacy—took time 
and active encouragement from outside the Court. Furthermore, 
Vauchez has argued, the integrationist views of the judges have not 
perpetuated themselves automatically but required active efforts on 
the part of insiders to indoctrinate future members of the Court and 
the broader European legal profession and thereby reproduce its 
 
 96. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 82, at 128 (pointing out that “as a group, in 
fact, the judges were relatively heterogeneous—their professional background 
ranging from national judiciaries, judicial administration, private legal practice, 
banking, politics, trade-unionism, and the law faculty”); Rasmussen, Establishing 
a Constitutional Practice of European Law, supra note 11, at 388–89 (arguing that 
the composition of the judges changed the trajectory of European jurisprudence); 
see Vauchez, Keeping the Dream Alive, supra note 14, at 52–53 (attributing the 
ability of such a diverse group of judges to reach consensus to professional 
socialization and the creation of a “transnational judicial esprit de corps”). 
 97. See Rasmussen, Establishing a Constitutional Practice of European Law, 
supra note 11, at 380 (noting Advocate-General Lagrange’s view of the “character 
of the ECJ as an administrative court, responsible for securing the rights and 
freedom of citizens in the face of administrative power”). 
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fundamental tenets.98  
None of this is to say that the simplifying assumptions about the 
Court as a unitary body with pro-integrationist preferences have not 
been useful as a tool for theory construction. The ECJ, after all, has 
issued single, per curiam opinions for more than six decades, and the 
consistent line of its decisions since the mid-1960s has been 
overwhelmingly integrationist. In the absence of detailed knowledge 
about the Court’s internal workings, it arguably made sense to adopt 
what Max Weber called “as if” assumptions, adopted not because 
they were realistic, but because they facilitated the creation of 
parsimonious theories generating testable hypotheses.99 What is 
clear, however, is that neither assumption seems to be supported 
empirically with respect to the early Court, which was both more 
divided and less securely integrationist than previous scholarship 
suggested.100 It also suggests that the judges’ tradition of maintaining 
strict secrecy regarding the internal deliberations of the Court may 
have significantly enhanced its independence vis-à-vis the Member 
governments, the subject to which we now turn. 
B. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: MEMBER STATE INTENTIONS AND 
JUDICIAL PREOCCUPATIONS 
Looking beyond the internal workings of the Court, we come to 
the first of several relational questions, namely the Court’s 
relationship with, and independence from, the Member governments 
that both created the Court and appointed its judges. As we have 
seen, there are multiple views on this question in political science 
and law. On one end of the spectrum is the purely intergovernmental 
view, which sees the court as an obedient servant of the Member 
States (or the least of the most powerful States), imputing no agency 
or causal importance to the Court. On the other end of the spectrum 
are the neofunctionalist and “trustee” views, which hold the Court to 
be almost entirely independent of the Member governments, which 
 
 98. Vauchez, Keeping the Dream Alive, supra note 14, at 67–68 (explaining 
how “jointly social and cognitive processes form a continuous socialization 
process,” which drove the development of the Court’s core beliefs). 
 99. See generally MAX WEBER, SOCIOLOGICAL WRITINGS (Wolf Heydebrand 
ed., 1994). 
 100. See Vauchez, Keeping the Dream Alive, supra note 14, at 58 (admitting the 
difficulty created by a lack of access, which offers few empirical options). 
  
1286 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [28:5 
are left to respond ineffectively to the Court’s audacious rulings. In 
between these two extremes is the principal-agent view, which 
regards the Court as possessing wide-ranging delegated powers and 
subject to Member State control mechanisms that, while difficult to 
use, do provide at least some limits on judicial discretion. Historical 
work promises to inform, and indeed already has informed, these 
debates with new findings on two key questions: first, the intent of 
the founders with respect to the Court and its future behavior, and 
second, the Court’s sensitivity (or lack thereof) to Member State 
preferences in issuing its landmark rulings.  
The first of these questions concerns the original intent of the 
founders, often invoked by participants in the scholarly debate (with 
little evidence either way) as: Did the founding Member 
governments intend for the ECJ to proceed as it did, consistent with a 
strong intergovernmentalist approach, or did they instead intend to 
design a traditional and deferential international court, which later 
escaped unexpectedly from their control? In her archival research 
into the negotiations of the founding Treaties of Paris (1951, 
establishing the ECSC) and Rome (1957, establishing the EEC and 
Euratom), Anne Boerger-de Smedt has revealed what were in fact 
highly variable intentions among the founders, resulting in a Court 
that combined strong elements of a traditional international or 
administrative court with some elements of a constitutional court.101  
For example, Boerger-de Smedt reveals a wide diversity of 
preferences among the Member States negotiating the first Court of 
the ECSC, with the French delegation (headed by Jean Monnet) 
seeking a weak court or even an ad hoc arbitration process to 
minimize potential interference with his prized supranational High 
 
 101. See Anne Boerger-De Smedt, La Cour de Justice dans les Négociations du 
Traité de Paris Instituant la CECA, 14 J. EUR. INTEGRATION HIST. 7, 30–33 (2008) 
[hereinafter Boerger-De Smedt, La Cour de Justice] (concluding that the final 
composition of the Court arose from an “uneasy compromise” between distinct 
positions held by negotiators of the treaties); Anne Boerger-De Smedt, Negotiating 
the Foundations of European Law, 1950−57: The Legal History of the Treaties of 
Paris and Rome, 21 CONTEMP. EUR. HIST. 339, 355 (2012) [hereinafter Boerger-
De Smedt, Negotiating the Foundations] (positing that in compromising the 
different perspectives in negotiations “jurists, without any master-plan in mind or 
even foreseeing how these provisions would play out in the future, introduced 
small measures towards [a constitutional court] wherever it seemed possible”). 
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Authority.102 The Benelux delegations, by contrast, sought a strong 
court precisely to limit High Authority discretion, but with access to 
the Court limited to governments, with no standing for private 
citizens.103 The German delegation (headed by Walter Hallstein) 
sought a federal-style constitutional court able to rule on the legality 
of Council as well as High Authority actions, with standing for 
private individuals as well as Member governments.104 The Court 
created by the Treaty of Paris represented a compromise among these 
positions, appearing primarily as a French-style administrative court 
tasked with ruling on the legality of High Authority decisions but 
with a modest “constitutional” element insofar as, for example, 
private individuals enjoyed limited access to the Court.105  
When the Member States convened again five years later to design 
the institutions of the more ambitious EEC, Member State positions 
were again diverse, with the French having hardened their position 
against supranationalism, the Germans remaining bent on 
establishing strong federal-style institutions, and the Benelux and 
Italian delegations somewhere in between.106 The details of the new 
ECJ were worked out primarily by a groupe de rédaction composed 
of legal experts, many of them committed federalists, acting under a 
mandate from their political principals.107 Interestingly, given the 
debacle of the rejection of the European Defense Community just 
two years earlier, all delegates were acutely aware of the limits 
imposed by the requirement of national ratification, and “[a]ll 
recognised that an institutional scheme too similar to the ECSC 
 
 102. Boerger-De Smedt, Negotiating the Foundations, supra note 101, at 340–
45 (detailing the tensions among the French, Benelux, and German camps and how 
they unfolded throughout the negotiations). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See Boerger-De Smedt, La Cour de Justice, supra note 101, at 27–28 
(recounting the debate over whether to allow private individuals access to the 
Court); Boerger-De Smedt, Negotiating the Foundations, supra note 101, at 346–
47 (showing that all three delegations, the French, the Benelux, and the German, 
had wins in terms of shaping the legal process). 
 106. Boerger-De Smedt, Negotiating the Foundations, supra note 101, at 348–
49. 
 107. See id. at 350–51 (highlighting the group’s integral role in deciding key 
points of tension and, compared with the Paris negotiations, their increased 
independence from direct political involvement). 
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would meet the same fate.”108  
Within the group, most of the small nucleus of pro-integration 
jurists, famously depicted in participant Pierre Pescatore’s account, 
favored a strong constitutional court but were limited by the political 
realities imposed by skeptical publics and parliaments and by the 
demands of ratification.109 Even so, Boerger-de Smedt argues, “the 
jurists carried just enough weight to inject a small dose of 
constitutionalism into the treaty’s legislative and jurisdictional 
system . . . .”110 
With respect to the famous Article 177 preliminary reference 
procedure, for example, Boerger-de Smedt shows how the Member 
governments sought to address the challenge of conflicting 
interpretations of EEC law by national courts and considered two 
options: a federal-style constitutional court, preferred by the German 
delegation, and a preliminary ruling mechanism inspired by the 
Italian constitutional system.111 The first of these options was 
“rejected since a federal system stood no chance of acceptance at the 
political level,” and the resulting system had the “contours of a 
federal supreme court system of judicial review, but would depend 
completely on the co-operation of national courts in order to 
function.”112 Like other scholars, Boerger-de Smedt finds no 
evidence that the Member States intended Article 177 and the 
preliminary reference procedure as a means for private citizens to 
challenge the legality of their own governments’ actions with respect 
to European law.113 
Other provisions reflected similar compromises among diverse 
positions. For example, while acknowledging that the introduction of 
 
 108. Id. at 350. 
 109. See Pescatore, supra note 25, at 172–73 (describing how the “judicial 
group created the conditions in which the jurisprudence of the court could make 
the extraordinary development” seen through, for example, Article 177’s 
preliminary reference procedure). 
 110. Boerger-De Smedt, Negotiating the Foundations, supra note 101, at 351. 
 111. Id. at 351–52. 
 112. Id. at 352 (noting that two key elements of the Italian-inspired system were 
left out of the final Court provision: “the stipulation that the ECJ’s rulings would 
be ‘binding’ on the national courts and the fact that the Court could also render 
preliminary rulings concerning the application of the treaty” (emphasis in 
original)). 
 113. Id. at 353. 
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Article 173 of the Treaty of Rome empowered the ECJ to rule on the 
legality of Council as well as Commission actions, Boerger-de Smedt 
points out:  
The second paragraph of Article 173 introduced a serious weakening of 
the Court, however, in that the new text severely restricted direct access to 
the Court by private parties against Community measures. This change 
was also intentional and resulted from the group’s desire to reverse the 
Court’s practice of widening its access to private persons.114  
Interestingly, this narrowing of the ECJ’s jurisdiction represents 
not only the limits to supranationalism imposed by the need for 
ratification; it also represents a new, and as far as I know the earliest, 
effort by Member governments to respond to ECJ activism by 
“clipping the wings” of the Court in subsequent treaties.115 
More generally, Boerger-de Smedt’s historical scholarship both 
supports and refutes distinct elements of the intergovernmentalist 
position on the Court of Justice, its mandate, and its independence. 
On the one hand, she makes clear, the text of the ECSC and EEC 
Treaties represent at best “timid” progress toward a constitutional 
court and reflect difficult compromises between nationalist and 
 
 114. Boerger-De Smedt, Negotiating the Foundations, supra note 101, at 353. 
The pertinent paragraphs of Article 173 read: 
The Court of Justice shall review the lawfulness of acts other than recommendations or 
opinions of the Council and the Commission. For this purpose, it shall be competent to 
give judgment on appeals by a Member State, the Council or the Commission on 
grounds of incompetence, of errors of substantial form, of infringement of this Treaty 
or of any legal provision relating to its application, or of abuse of power. 
Any natural or legal person may, under the same conditions, appeal against a decision 
addressed to him or against a decision which, although in the form of a regulation or a 
decision addressed to another person, is of direct and specific concern to him. 
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, supra note 45, art. 173; 
see also TFEU, supra note 45, art. 263 (implementing much of the language of the 
original Article 173). 
 115. The Member governments did, in the Maastricht Treaty, dramatically 
restrict the ECJ’s jurisdiction with respect to the two new “pillars” of common 
foreign and security policy, and justice and home affairs, respectively, as well as 
limiting the impact of a previous ECJ ruling on occupational pensions in the so-
called “Barber Protocol.” See POLLACK, supra note 38, at 172 (mentioning the 
“Barber Protocol” as one of a few instances of constitutional revisions to ECJ 
rulings). These are often depicted as exceptions to the general difficulty—indeed, 
near impossibility—of Member States punishing the Court for activism in its 
interpretation of the treaties, but Boerger-De Smedt’s finding about Article 173 
appears to represent a new and much earlier instance. 
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federalist preferences among the original six, as an 
intergovernmentalist theory of international negotiation would 
suggest.116 On the other hand, the existence of support for a strong 
federalist court among multiple delegations to both the Paris and 
Rome negotiations clearly falsifies the early intergovernmentalist 
view of national governments as the consistent and jealous defenders 
of national sovereignty. National preferences were more complex 
than such an image might imply, reflecting both the differing 
constraints under which the various delegations labored, as well as 
the sharply varying individual legal and ideological views held by 
the leaders of each delegation and their legal advisors in the groupe 
de redaction.117  
More broadly, Boerger-de Smedt’s analysis also makes clear that 
the resulting compromise, a mix of classic international law, 
administrative law, and constitutional features, makes it difficult, if 
not impossible, to attribute any coherent “intentions” to the diverse 
founders of the treaty—a point often made by critics of originalism 
in the United States.118 In large part because of the pro-integration 
“original intentions” of some—but not all—of the founders, the 
resulting treaties left considerable, though far from unlimited, 
latitude for the new Court to engage in judicial activism: 
The option of transforming the ECJ into a constitutional court, although 
earnestly considered at various points during the negotiations of the Paris 
and Rome treaties, was ultimately pushed aside. Instead, the jurists, 
 
 116. See Boerger-De Smedt, Negotiating the Foundations, supra note 101, at 
354–55 (recognizing, however, that some constitutional traits were pushed forward 
and attributing this reticence to the fact that the conference that drafted these 
articles was much more diverse than their predecessors). 
 117. In this sense, Boerger-De Smedt’s findings can be read as evidence of the 
superiority of liberal intergovernmentalism, which posits that national preferences 
will vary across Member States as a function of domestic political, legal, and 
ideological factors, over the more parsimonious but misleading 
intergovernmentalist theories of the 1960s and 1970s. See generally ANDREW 
MORAVCSIK, THE CHOICE FOR EUROPE: SOCIAL PURPOSE AND STATE POWER FROM 
MESSINA TO MAASTRICHT (1998) (postulating that European integration was the 
result of rational choices made by national leaders pursuing political economic 
interests “that evolved slowly in response to structural incentives in the global 
economy”). 
 118. See generally Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the 
Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085 (1989) (providing background on the original-
intent debate and its current status in the United States). 
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without any master-plan in mind or even foreseeing how these provisions 
would play out in the future, introduced small measures towards that end 
wherever it seemed possible. The compromise empirically achieved 
between two opposing trends led to equivocal outcomes that could later 
be used by proponents to construe the legal order according to their views 
on the European integration. Because of these ambiguities, the further 
development of European law was left to the individuals who would apply 
the treaties and use the legal tools provided to advance European 
integration . . . . The treaty’s provisions alone could not automatically 
have produced this outcome by themselves, but they did ultimately make 
it possible.119  
This finding in turn raises a second set of questions about the 
independence of the court and the judges themselves. Were the 
judges of the new court slavishly obedient to Member State 
preferences as per a purely intergovernmentalist view? Were they 
entirely independent of Member governments, able to pursue their 
preferences and/or their conception of the law without fear of 
retribution as per a trustee account? Or were the judges instead 
strategic agents of the Member States, pursuing their aims with a 
degree of discretion that was substantial but bounded by the real 
possibility of backlash from either the Member governments or 
national courts as per a principal-agent approach? Here, the answer 
seems unambiguous: neither a strong intergovernmentalist nor a 
strong trustee approach survive an encounter with the archives, 
which depict a Court that was profoundly conscious of strongly held 
national preferences and a possible Member State backlash, and 
strategically tailored its rulings during the early years to what it 
believed the Member States would tolerate.  
Here again, we can look to Rasmussen’s archival research on the 
Court’s decision in Van Gend, where he finds that the substance of 
the decision was attributable not only to the law of the treaties or to 
the Court’s own preferences, but also and importantly to the judges’ 
acute awareness of the political context of their decision and the 
potential for backlash against it.120 The judges tempered their 
decision, and parted company with the strongly integrationist 
 
 119. Boerger-De Smedt, Negotiating the Foundations, supra note 101, at 355. 
 120. Rasmussen, Establishing a Constitutional Practice of European Law, supra 
note 11, at 391 (describing how the ECJ moved forward cautiously with its 
decision in Van Gend). 
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Commission Legal Service, in at least two ways. First, in declaring 
the direct effect doctrine, the Court interpreted that doctrine to 
include “only treaty articles placing negative obligations on the 
member states.”121 Only in subsequent years would the Court make 
clear that the doctrine of direct effect applied to other treaty articles 
and to secondary legislation, and that direct effect operated 
“horizontally” in relations among private actors as well as 
“vertically” between private actors and Member governments.122  
Just as importantly, the Court in Van Gend did not follow the 
Commission’s advice to declare outright the primacy of European 
law. Here, Rasmussen cites an internal memorandum by Trabucchi, 
who noted the difficulties that such a doctrine would pose in the legal 
systems of Italy and Germany:  
Consequently, Trabucchi recommended “for now” (pour le moment) that 
the Court respect the national jurisdiction with regard to primacy . . . . To 
Trabucchi—and probably the majority behind the ruling with him—this 
caution with regard to the primacy of European law was clearly politically 
motivated and intended to be temporary.123  
The Court’s caution was indeed temporary, and it would take the 
next logical step of declaring primacy the following year in its Costa 
v. ENEL decision.124  
 
 121. Id. at 390. 
 122. See, e.g., Case C-43/75, Defrenne v. Sabena, 1976 E.C.R. 455 (applying 
the direct effect doctrine to the principle of equal pay for men and women as 
established in TFEU Article 157, as well as beginning the process of 
differentiating the “horizontal” and “vertical” direct effect doctrines). 
 123. Id.; Rasmussen, Establishing a Constitutional Practice of European Law, 
supra note 11, at 390–91 (explaining that Trabucchi observed that Germany’s and 
Italy’s dualist constitutions meant that they had to implement international law 
only by first acting through parliament). On the relative caution, and ambiguity, of 
the Van Gend ruling relative to Gaudet’s Legal Service brief, see also Vauchez, 
The Transnational Politics of Judicialization, supra note 21, at 11–12. Vauchez 
emphasizes and chronicles the post-decision speeches and writings of integrationist 
judges and other legal figures that: 
turned the ambiguous Van Gend en Loos into a clear-cut and far-reaching judicial fiat. 
On the whole, it all occurred as if a kind of second judicial deliberation had been 
initiated, one that would fabricate the overall reach of Van Gend en Loos by extending 
in manifold ways the sense and the validity of its ‘message’ well above and beyond the 
relatively prudent and balanced considerations of the (original) decision itself. 
Vauchez, The Transnational Politics of Judicialization, supra note 21, at 14. 
 124. On the significance of the Court’s decision in Costa, including the key role 
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Rasmussen’s research is thus far unusual in that it provides a 
window into the internal deliberations of the Court, which otherwise 
remain largely opaque. Other scholars have nevertheless noted the 
caution of the Court in these early decisions, which frequently 
declared major constitutional principles in cases where the 
substantive impact of the ruling on Member State interests was 
minimal. As Alter points out, “the ECJ expanded its jurisdictional 
authority by establishing legal principles but not applying the 
principles to the cases at hand.”125 In the Costa ruling, for example, 
the judges declared the supremacy of European Community law over 
national law but “found that the Italian law . . . did not violate EC 
law.”126 Bill Davies’ account of the constitutional dialogue between 
the ECJ and the German Federal Constitutional Court similarly 
depicts ECJ judges who were acutely aware of the reception of their 
rulings by national courts as well as by Member governments, and 
more generally to “a much more timid set of European institutions 
than we have come to expect, afraid of . . . recalcitrance and willing 
to reach important compromises in order to save face and garner 
support.”127 It is to Davies’ account, and more generally to the 
question of ECJ relations with national courts, that we turn next. 
C. THE ECJ AND NATIONAL COURTS 
One of the central topics of political science scholarship on the 
ECJ has been the Court’s relationship with national courts. On this 
question, work by political scientists and legal scholars over the past 
decade has considerably nuanced the early “empowerment” thesis 
whereby acceptance of the ECJ and EU law brought new powers to 
national courts able to draw upon a new body of law and to engage in 
de facto judicial review of the conduct of the executive and 
legislative branches.  
Drawing on careful and meticulous readings of the judicial 
dialogue between the ECJ and national courts, Alter was able to 
 
of Advocate General Maurice Lagrange, see Cohen, supra note 82, at 125–27 
(emphasizing the role played by Lagrange’s opinion that the Treaty of Rome had 
“the nature of a real constitution”). 
 125. Karen J. Alter, Who Are the “Masters of the Treaty”?: European 
Governments and the European Court of Justice, 52 INT’L ORG. 121, 131 (1998). 
 126. Id. 
 127. DAVIES, supra note 10, at 7. 
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demonstrate a consistent distinction between lower courts, which 
were far more likely to experience empowerment and hence embrace 
the preliminary reference procedure, and national high courts, which 
accepted only reluctantly, conditionally, and after considerable 
delay.128 Later work provided evidence of an even more fundamental 
and widespread resistance to ECJ jurisprudence among both high and 
lower courts. Among high courts, Peter Lindseth’s landmark book 
explores “the limits of strong deference” to the ECJ among high 
courts in Germany, Italy, Denmark, and the Czech Republic, which 
have insisted on their right to rule on the compatibility of the EU and 
its activities with national constitutional provisions regarding human 
rights, democratic accountability, and the separation of powers.129 
Even among lower courts, a growing number of scholars have 
documented the strategies whereby national courts either resisted 
sending preliminary references to the ECJ—primarily through 
invocation of the acte clair doctrine—and/or found ways to 
“contain” unwelcome impacts of the Court’s jurisprudence.130 In 
short, this new scholarship demonstrated that national courts, often 
depicted as the ECJ’s co-opted allies against recalcitrant Member 
States in early neofunctionalist scholarship, were in fact both allies 
and a source of resistance and restraint on the Court’s discretion. 
 
 128. ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW, supra note 57, 
at 48–49 (observing that the contrast may be due to higher courts’ greater concern 
for the overall coherence of national law, and lower courts’ greater focus on the 
immediate cases before them); see also, supra notes 55–58 and accompanying text. 
 129. See LINDSETH, supra note 10, at 165 (“By the end of the 1990s . . . several 
leading national high courts had given a much clearer sense of the points at which 
they too could no longer defer to the ECJ, consistent with their obligation under 
the postwar constitutional settlement.”). In particular, the German Constitutional 
Court, in its Maastricht and Lisbon Treaty decisions, as well as other constitutional 
courts considering those same treaty provisions, expressed concern about the 
potentially uncontrolled transfer of sovereignty that might undermine 
constitutional guarantees of democratic accountability, and—in light of the ECJ’s 
failure to delineate the boundaries of Community competence—claimed for 
themselves the ultimate right of Kompetenz-Kompetenz. Id. at 185. See generally 
id. at 133–187 (discussing supranational delegation, national judicial review, and 
the limits on deference). 
 130. See, e.g., Chalmers, supra note 68, at 103–04 (noting that British courts 
have not applied acte clair as narrowly as the House of Lords intended); Golub, 
supra note 54, at 368–69 (noting that British courts invoked acte clair to interpret 
environmental directives themselves); Rytter & Wind, supra note 68, at 482–83 
(finding that Danish judges tend to read ambiguities in favor of national laws). 
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The historical scholarship on the relationship between the ECJ and 
national courts—what Davies calls “reception studies”—strongly 
supports this more nuanced view of national courts in relation to the 
ECJ.131 In brief, these historical studies show that national court 
resistance to ECJ jurisprudence was real and sustained, at least in 
some countries, and that variation in the reception of EU law and 
ECJ rulings has taken place not only between high and lower courts, 
but also cross-nationally as a consequence of systematic differences 
in cultural, political, and legal traditions. In Davies’ formulation,  
At the center of the concept of a reception study is the idea that each 
Member State represents a distinctive set of contextual, cultural, and legal 
circumstances that determine the willingness and the conditions under 
which a particular Member State’s government and judiciary will submit 
to the primacy of European law. These factors include elite perceptions of 
national interest, varying domestic institutional constellations, and 
oscillating streams of public and intellectual opinion toward the ECJ and 
European integration.132 
Because these factors vary across Member States, Davies 
continues,  
Resistance and response to legal integration have therefore led to 
nonlinear acceptance of the ECJ’s jurisprudence by national actors across 
time and across geography. What exists across Europe is a patchwork, 
contingent judicial settlement, in which different Member States impose 
differing conditions on the acceptance of legal primacy, dependent on the 
broader reception of the ECJ, European integration, and European law at 
that given time.133 
Reception studies of the kind advocated by Davies are by no 
means absent in political science scholarship: indeed, some of the 
landmark political science works cited above fit Davies’ description 
of reception studies quite well.134 What historical scholarship can add 
 
 131. DAVIES, supra note 10, at 4 (asserting that “the enigma of the ECJ’s 
expansion can only be explained by looking at how the Member Stales ‘received’ 
the ECJ’s decisions, not only within the courtroom, but, much more crucially, 
among the public and academia and within the government machinery itself”). 
 132. Id. at 4–5. 
 133. Id. at 7. 
 134. For multi-country studies, see, e.g., ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE 
SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW, supra note 57 (demonstrating how the debate 
between proponents and opponents of the European supremacy molded the 
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to these previous works is not only the use of archival sources but 
also the close attention to nationally specific, contextual factors that 
might help to explain cross-national differences in reception. The 
existing political science scholarship has not been blind to these 
national differences, but the emphasis in early neofunctionalist 
scholarship was on identifying integration mechanisms common to 
multiple Member States, such as judicial empowerment and inter-
court competition hypotheses, rather than explaining the differences 
in reception of ECJ jurisprudence across Member States.  
In addition, historical studies also demonstrate that national 
differences in the receptivity of domestic courts to European law not 
only responded to, but also helped to shape, the history of EU legal 
integration. First, in a recent article, Karin van Leeuwen examines 
the Dutch constitutional tradition and the constitutional reforms of 
the 1950s, regarding the relationship between domestic and 
international law in The Netherlands.135 National courts’ reception of 
ECJ jurisprudence, she argues, is likely to be conditioned very 
substantially by the constitutional structure of a given Member State, 
in subtle ways that are not likely to be captured by simple 
dichotomies such as the difference between formally monist and 
dualist systems.136 Specifically, van Leeuwen argues that the Dutch 
tradition of acceptance of international law, together with a postwar 
political culture that was strongly favorable to European integration, 
predisposed judges in that country to be open to accepting the 
 
European jurisprudence); CONANT, JUSTICE CONTAINED, supra note 44 (arguing 
that implementation of ECJ interpretations depends on the actors that engage on 
the legal questions); THE EUROPEAN COURT AND NATIONAL COURTS, supra note 2 
(exploring constitutionalization of EU law as a conversation between the European 
and national courts). For country-specific studies, see, e.g., Chalmers, supra note 
68 (surveying trends in the UK’s application of EU law); Golub, supra note 54 
(researching how domestic political considerations in Britain hindered national 
judges from referencing EU law); Rytter & Wind, supra note 68 (examining the 
reluctance of Danish courts to interpret EU law and the implications this will have 
on their influence in European jurisprudence). 
 135. Karen van Leeuwen, On Democratic Concerns and Legal Traditions: The 
Dutch 1953 and 1956 Constitutional Reforms “Towards” Europe, 21 CONTEMP. 
EUR. HIST. 357 (2012) (finding that this relationship between national and 
European jurisprudence sculpted the nature of the Netherlands’ membership in the 
EU and pushed for European law’s supremacy over national law). 
 136. Id. at 357–58 (criticizing the emphasis on simple dualities as reductive, and 
arguing that the Dutch example demonstrates the complexity of national 
reception). 
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jurisdiction of the ECJ and to use the preliminary reference 
procedure of Article 177.137 Just as importantly, she reviews the 
constitutional reforms adopted by the Dutch Parliament between 
1953 and 1956, which allowed for internal effects of international 
law but imposed conditions—such as the self-executing nature of the 
international laws—that were inherently ambiguous.138 Indeed, she 
argues, it is this constitutional framework that helps explain the 
pattern whereby eight of the first eleven preliminary references to the 
ECJ, including the request in Van Gend, originated in Dutch 
courts.139  
By far the most detailed historical “reception study” of an EU 
Member State is Davies’ meticulously detailed study of the 
resistance to the ECJ by the German Federal Constitutional Court, 
centering around the domestic origins and European response to the 
FCC’s famous Solange I decision in 1974.140 Constituting the most 
direct challenge to the ECJ’s authority in the history of EU legal 
integration, the Solange I case has been studied previously by other 
scholars, and the “constitutional dialogue” between the FCC and the 
ECJ features prominently in many EU law casebooks. Davies’ 
careful archival research, however, together with an ambitious law-
in-context approach, provides substantial new insights into both the 
origins of the German challenge and the response by the ECJ and 
other European institutions.  
With respect to the origins of the decision, Davies poses the puzzle 
of how the Federal Constitutional Court, having been the first 
national high court to accept (albeit grudgingly) the ECJ’s doctrines 
of direct effect and legal supremacy and coming from arguably the 
 
 137. See id. at 358–59 (observing that this predisposition allowed Dutch judges 
to view the European community as an international sovereignty of its own). 
 138. Id. at 366–72 (arguing that, while these reforms did place limits on the 
primacy of European law, they still greatly encouraged European law’s 
development). 
 139. Id. at 358–59; see also Vauchez, The Transnational Politics of 
Judicialization, supra note 21, at 10 (emphasizing not only the Dutch 
constitutional system but also the activities of the Dutch section of FIDE, which 
“launched a working group in charge of identifying which dispositions of the 
Treaty establishing the EC are self-executing” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
In this context, Vauchez argues, “the recourse to this [preliminary reference] 
procedure before the ECJ soon became a distinctively Dutch phenomenon 
spearheaded by FIDE members.” Id. 
 140. DAVIES, supra note 10. 
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most consistently pro-integration Member State, became—and 
would remain—the most fundamental challenger to the ECJ in its 
authoritative interpretation of European law.141 The 1974 Solange I 
decision, in which the Federal Constitutional Court questioned the 
adequacy of the ECJ’s protection of human rights guaranteed under 
the German Basic Law, and reserved to itself the right to determine 
whether European Community actions were compatible with such 
rights, seemed to many observers to be a surprising power-grab by 
the Court.  
Through careful research, however, Davies reveals that the Court 
was in fact giving voice to a set of concerns that had arisen within 
the West German legal academy over the previous two decades and 
had eventually spread to a wider public.142 Put simply, by the 1960s 
West German legal scholars, and the general public, had become 
attached to the Basic Law’s guarantees of human rights and 
democracy, and had grown concerned that the European 
Community’s lack of explicit human rights guarantees and its 
persistent democratic deficit made it incompatible with the German 
constitutional order.143 Yet these concerns had not been taken up and 
espoused at the European level by the West German government, 
which remained reflexively pro-integration under the leadership of a 
relatively small and stable group of supranationalist leaders.144 Into 
this breach stepped the Constitutional Court, which in its decision 
implicitly invited European Community institutions—including, but 
not limited to, the ECJ—to provide the sorts of guaranteed human 
rights protections already present in the Basic Law.145  
 
 141. Id. at 10–11 (describing this constitutional paradox as a problem whereby 
Germany needed both its submission to European primacy as well as consistently 
democratic jurisprudence within the country). 
 142. Id. at 184–85 (explaining that the Federal Constitutional Court decision 
was about “increasing congruence . . . not an attempt to grab power back from the 
ECJ”). 
 143. Id. at 42–44 (explaining how the German concern was not that the 
European Court made radical steps but that it had not gone far enough in protecting 
rights). 
 144. Id. at 45 (noting that these pro-integration voices were focused in the 
Foreign and Economics Ministries, increasingly sidelining the views of the Interior 
and Justice Ministries). 
 145. Id. at 184–85 (noting that the president of the German Federal 
Constitutional Court confirmed after the case that the court sought to pressure the 
ECJ to improve its protection of rights). 
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The Solange I ruling proved to be the first volley in a true 
constitutional dialogue, challenging European Community 
institutions to deliver convincing human rights guarantees to satisfy 
the Federal Constitutional Court’s concerns. The decision, Davies 
vividly recounts, prompted alarm in the European Commission in 
Brussels, which was concerned about the prospect of contagion if 
other Member States’ courts similarly moved to challenge the 
supremacy of the ECJ and the EU legal order.146 The decision was 
also a source of severe embarrassment to the West German 
government, which sought to defend its reputation as a staunchly 
pro-integration Member State and avoid the possible opening of 
infringement proceedings against the country.147  
Indeed, the alarm felt in Brussels and Bonn was aggravated by the 
economic and political crises of the early 1970s, which had left the 
European Community looking decidedly fragile, and Davies 
reconstructs the frantic, behind-the-scenes efforts by the 
Commission, the West German government, and its EU counterparts, 
as well as the European Parliament, to quickly put in place some 
statement of human rights guarantees at the European level to satisfy 
the Federal Constitutional Court.148 Several of these efforts focused 
on the political branches of the European Community, including 
most famously a joint declaration on human rights adopted by the 
Commission, the Council, and the European Parliament in 1977.149 
But the ECJ itself also responded, with a series of decisions in which 
it first invoked—in the 1974 Nold decision150—and later relied 
upon—in the 1975 Rutili case151—rights enumerated in the European 
 
 146. Id. at 185–86 (recalling concerns that the decision would open a “Pandora’s 
Box”). 
 147. Id. at 186. 
 148. Id. at 192–98. 
 149. Joint Declaration 1977 O.J. (C 103) 1 (EC); see also DAVIES, supra note 
10, at 180–96 (observing that the European Parliament was credited with 
proposing the Declaration in order to add legitimacy to the Declaration, even 
though it did not begin in Parliament). 
 150. Case 4/73, J. Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgrosshandlung v. Comm’n, 1974 
E.C.R. 491, 501–02 (referring to the Convention’s protection of property rights as 
an example of that protection in public international law). 
 151. Case 36/75, Rutili v. Minister for the Interior, 1975 E.C.R. 1220, 1232 
(finding that limitations on a Member State’s control of aliens derive from the 
Convention’s prohibition on national security restrictions that interfere with certain 
rights). 
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Convention on Human Rights.152 By 1979, the Court went further in 
its Hauer decision,153 ruling that: 
[F]undamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of the 
law, the observance of which is ensured by the Court. In safeguarding 
those rights, the latter is bound to draw inspiration from constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States, so that measures which are 
incompatible with the fundamental rights recognized by the constitutions 
of those States are unacceptable in the Community. International treaties 
for the protection of human rights on which the Member States have 
collaborated or of which they are signatories, can also supply guidelines 
which should be followed within the framework of Community law.154 
The Court’s gradual move to incorporate fundamental human 
rights provisions from the European Convention on Human Rights 
and the constitutional traditions of the Member States, despite the 
absence of any reference to these in the treaties, did eventually 
satisfy the Federal Constitutional Court, which in its 1986 Solange II 
decision rescinded the conditions it had placed in the way of its 
acceptance of European Community law.155 
Through careful, new archival research, Davies provides a far 
deeper understanding of a crucial episode in the history of EU legal 
integration. In so doing, Davies insists on the need for political 
science and legal scholars to test hypotheses through careful archival 
research.156 To historians, he insists that “legal history is more than 
just the law,”157 and that only a contextual approach, which places 
legal decisions and doctrinal debates in their social and political 
context, will generate a clear understanding of the past.158 Such social 
 
 152. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222. 
 153. Case 44/79, Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, 1979 E.C.R. 3729. 
 154. Id. at 3744–45. 
 155. BVerfG, Oct. 22, 1986, BVerfGE 340, 387, 1986; DAVIES, supra note 10, 
at 198 (emphasizing that the decisions in Nold and Hauer were crucial for the 
German Federal Constitutional Court’s change in view). 
 156. DAVIES, supra note 10, at 3 (arguing that the arguments of legal integration 
scholars, while thought-provoking, remain incomplete until they survive 
“empirically grounded historical scrutiny”). 
 157. Id. at 216. 
 158. Id. at 210 (“Legal integration did not occur in a specialist vacuum, and the 
ECJ, particularly in the early formative years, could not rely on its decisions being 
unnoticed and misunderstood by uneducated and disinterested populations. The 
legal autonomy suggested by the legalist perspective is only partially in evidence. 
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forces, he argues, help to explain the Federal Constitutional Court’s 
historic—and ongoing—challenge to the ECJ, as well as the Court’s 
response to it.159  
Perhaps most strikingly to a social scientist, Davies emphasizes 
the specific, contingent constellation of social forces in post-war 
West Germany that gave rise to the Federal Constitutional Court’s 
challenge: 
Clearly then, of the new research being undertaken by historians of the 
EU’s legal system, reception studies of European law within the Member 
States are some of the most important. Such analyses face the complexity 
of coming to grips with the national idiosyncrasies of the Member States. 
In the case reviewed here, we must first locate the dynamics of reception 
within the unique political culture of the FRG [Federal Republic of 
Germany]. Its willingness to “sacrifice” national interests and financial 
aid in the name of an ever closer union is a product of an exceptional set 
of circumstances that the FRG found itself in at its founding in 1949 . . . . 
Without these factors in place in our narrative, it is impossible to explain 
accurately why the Solange case came about and why it was the FCC and 
not the FRG government that resisted the ECJ. Focus on the national, on 
the particular, is crucial in explaining the formation of European law, 
even if our instincts point us toward the ECJ, the Legal Service, and other 
supra- or transnational elements of the system.160 
For Davies, as a historian attempting to do justice to the details of 
this particularly significant episode in the history of EU legal 
integration, attention to the particularities and idiosyncrasies of the 
West German case is indeed appropriate. From the perspective of the 
social sciences, however, the imperative is just the opposite, namely 
to move from the specific to the general, to explain comparatively 
why it is that national courts in some countries (like The 
Netherlands) have readily accepted the ECJ and its rulings, while 
others (like Germany) have displayed ambivalence, and still others 
(like Denmark) have resisted sending preliminary reference requests 
at all.  
 
The law cannot be completely independent of broader social forces.”). 
 159. Id. (noting that the Court was aware of the social discourse and was also 
aware of the Court’s effect on that discourse). 
 160. Id. at 206–07. 
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D. THE ECJ AND CONSTITUTIONALIZATION 
Finally, on the question of explaining the constitutionalization of 
the treaties, or the emergence of “constitutional practice,” the 
cumulative evidence of historical scholarship reviewed in the 
previous three sections points to a constitutionalization process that 
was more contingent, and more contested, than the heroic account 
put forward by legal scholars and by the early neofunctionalist 
literature. As a result of new historical scholarship, we see that the 
founding Member States, far from being united in their strict defense 
of national sovereignty, were in fact divided on the question whether 
the new Community would be a federal body with a constitutional 
court or an international treaty with an administrative court. The 
inelegant compromises reached in the Treaties of Paris and Rome 
yielded a Community and a Court characterized by discrete 
constitutional elements that could be used by future judges to 
construct an integrationist jurisprudence.  
With respect to the Court itself, we have seen that the essential 
decisions—to adopt a teleological approach to legal interpretation 
that conceived of the treaties as a de facto constitution creating a new 
type of legal order, and to subsequently proclaim the core doctrines 
of direct effect and supremacy—were reached only gradually by 
judges on the early court, who remained far more cautious and far 
more divided during these early years than both scholars and the 
general public had been led to believe. Furthermore, while the 
resulting legal revolution can indeed be interpreted as a bold, 
audacious act of agency on the part of the Court, we see that the 
judges were indeed aware of the political constraints on their actions: 
proceeding cautiously, tailoring their decisions to the limits of the 
politically acceptable, expanding the scope of their decisions 
gradually over time, and reacting in clear ways to direct challenges 
like the German Constitutional Court’s Solange I decision.  
Finally, the research undertaken by scholars like Davies and 
Rasmussen suggests that the law did not, in fact, serve significantly 
as a “mask and shield” for the ECJ during these early years. Instead, 
we get a picture of a European Community in which national 
governments, national courts, and national legal communities were 
generally aware of the cases coming before the ECJ and understood 
their significance, and in which national governments, national 
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courts, and other actors accepted or resisted the Court’s legal 
revolution to different extents, in different ways, and for different 
reasons.161 
III. WHAT’S MISSING 
The New EU Legal History, then, has already shed light on some 
of the core questions that have preoccupied legal and political 
science scholars for decades. Still, the scholars who have undertaken 
this research have not been driven exclusively by a desire to test 
political scientists’ theories, and even where they have, such 
scholarship remains in its infancy, and subject to the “small-n” 
concern that the findings of these individual historical studies may 
not be generalizable beyond the immediate subject of the study. We 
can and no doubt will learn more in time as historical scholars move 
to study the Court’s actions in additional cases, as well as the 
reception of those cases among a wider group of Member States. In 
addition to this general desire for more studies and a larger n of cases 
from which to learn, we can also identify some additional questions 
crying out for answers by historical scholars who have neglected 
them until now. Specifically, I identify four questions to which 
political scientists might look to their historian colleagues for 
answers, or at least clues, to perennial questions about the Court and 
the process of EU legal integration. 
A. THE MEMBER STATES, THE TREATIES, AND JUDICIAL 
INDEPENDENCE 
Perhaps an obvious question with which to begin has to do with 
Member State preferences and negotiations in the EU’s founding 
treaties with respect to the independence of the EU judiciary. To be 
sure, Boerger-de Smedt has examined the negotiation of the Treaties 
of Paris and Rome, with a primary focus on the fundamental nature 
of the court—administrative or constitutional, federal or 
international—as well as the nature of the court’s jurisdiction, the 
standing of private parties, and the relationship between the ECJ and 
national courts through the preliminary reference procedure.162 In 
 
 161. DAVIES, supra note 10, at 7. 
 162. See Boerger-De Smedt, Negotiating the Foundations, supra note 101 
(arguing that a few European politicians inserted into the treaties the potential for 
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creating the Court, however, Member States also made several 
important decisions about provisions that are widely seen to 
influence the independence of the judiciary, which is largely absent 
from Boerger-de Smedt’s analysis. For example, the treaties 
established a system in which judges are appointed by common 
accord for a six-year, renewable term. In so doing, the Member 
States created judges who, unlike members of the U.S. Supreme 
Court, enjoy only short terms and must be re-nominated (de facto by 
their respective Member governments) and reappointed (by common 
accord of the Member States) thereafter if they seek to retain their 
positions. This feature of the Court is important because we know 
that many of the early judges did serve for multiple terms, in some 
cases for decades, being re-nominated and reappointed multiple 
times. It also arguably reduced the judges’ independence compared 
with other potential schemes characterized by either longer terms or 
nonrenewable terms.  
As it happens, however, the Member governments designed 
additional features in the Court’s Statute—adopted as a protocol to 
the treaty—which held that, “The deliberations of the Court of 
Justice shall be and shall remain secret.”163 This provision, which has 
been widely interpreted as an effort by the judges to decrease their 
vulnerability to Member State pressure and thereby to counteract the 
effects of short, renewable terms, was in fact inserted by the Member 
State governments themselves. This, however, raises important 
questions for historians of the period: Why did the Member States 
design a judicial appointment system with short, renewable terms? 
Were they seeking to limit the judges’ independence? Why, then, did 
they commit the judges to deliberate in secret, and hence insulate 
judges against attacks for their individual votes in contentious cases? 
Were they simply following familiar templates of civil-law 
procedure from their own domestic experience? Or were these 
decisions a deliberate federalist effort to shelter a new and vulnerable 
supranational court from criticism and controversy by forcing it to 
rule as a collective body? These are important questions for those 
who seek to understand the intentions of the founders and the early 
 
the ECJ to develop a constitutional interpretation, even though most governments 
did not prefer European supremacy). 
 163. Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice, supra note 18, art. 35. 
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years of the Court, and yet answers are thus far elusive. The dual 
questions of judicial appointment and judicial dissent would also 
remain relevant beyond the design stage and into the early life of the 
Court, as we shall see presently. 
B. THE EARLY COURT AND ITS PROCEDURES 
A second, closely related question has to do with the early Court 
of the 1950s and early 1960s, as it sought to establish the rules of 
procedure and the modus operandi of a young and self-consciously 
new kind of court. Based on the work of legal scholars, we know 
that the ECJ, from its early years, adopted rules of procedure that 
reinforced the strict secrecy of the Court’s deliberations.164 We also 
know that the early Court vacillated in its style of legal 
interpretation, which drew alternately on the plain language of the 
treaty (text), on the intent of the founding Member States (intent), 
and eventually, to a growing extent, on the objectives set down in 
the treaty (object, or the teleological approach).165 We also know 
that the early Court settled upon a particular literary style for its 
decisions, modeled apparently after the French judicial style of 
terse, per curiam decisions with relatively little reference to either 
legal precedent or academic commentary.166 Yet we know very 
little—indeed, virtually nothing—about the motivations of the 
founding judges and their reasons for adopting these rules of 
procedure, strategies of interpretation, or the style of their 
decisions. The procedural and literary decisions taken at this early 
stage would produce lasting impacts on the Court’s jurisprudence, 
and previous accounts have been at best brief and anecdotal 
 
 164. See, e.g., Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities of 19 June 1991, art. 3, 1991 O.J. (L 176) 7 (requiring judges to 
“swear that I will preserve the secrecy of the deliberations of the Court”); id. art. 
27 (mandating that deliberations occur in closed sessions and that “[o]nly Judges 
who were present at the oral proceedings, and the Assistant Rapporteur, if any, 
entrusted with the consideration of the case may take part in the deliberations”). 
 165. See generally, e.g., Nial Fennelly, Legal Interpretation at the European 
Court of Justice, 20 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 656, 657 (1997) (enunciating “the 
essential elements of the Court’s approach to legal interpretation”). 
 166. See generally, e.g., Giuseppe Federico Mancini & David T. Keeling, 
Language, Culture and Politics in the Life of the European Court of Justice, 1 
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 397, 397–98 (1995) (analyzing the multilingual nature of the 
Court and noting that French, the working language of the Court, is a “rigorous and 
terse language which puts a penalty on the florid and twisted”). 
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regarding judicial decisions at this early, critical juncture.167 
C. JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS  
A third question has to do with the perennial question of judicial 
appointments and reappointments. By the mid-1960s, if not earlier, it 
was clear to EEC Member State governments that the Court was a 
highly consequential body, which Member governments could 
influence, in principle, by either selecting judicial nominees with 
views similar to their own or potentially by second-guessing other 
states’ nominations when it came time for the Members to appoint 
the judges by “common accord.”168 This is indeed what political 
principals have done with respect to other courts, both domestic169 
and international,170 and one might expect that, with the adoption of 
important, adverse decisions, Member governments would use their 
judicial appointment powers to influence, even at the margins, the 
“endogenous preferences” of the judges on the Court.  
Thus far, however, scholarship seems to support Alter’s contention 
that EU Member governments do not seem to use their nomination 
powers to promote like-minded judges, nor do they question the 
nominations of other Member States, whose nominations are 
invariably rubber-stamped by the other Members.171 Rasmussen’s 
research lends at least anecdotal credence to this view, noting as it 
 
 167. See, e.g., Mancini, supra note 2 (providing the perspective of a former 
judge of the ECJ). 
 168. Note that the Court’s practice of deliberating in secret and not revealing the 
votes or opinions of individual judges arguably protects serving judges against 
retaliation for unpopular votes when it comes time to reappoint them. However, 
this should not prevent Member governments from nominating and appointing 
first-time judges whose views on European integration or on specific questions 
likely to come before the Court are broadly consistent with their own. 
 169. See generally, e.g., Bryon J. Moraski & Charles R. Shipan, The Politics of 
Supreme Court Nominations: A Theory of Institutional Constraints and Choices, 
43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1069 (1999) (describing the complex “nomination game” 
played by U.S. presidents and senators in the appointment of federal judges). 
 170. See generally, e.g., Manfred Elsig & Mark A. Pollack, Agents, Trustees, 
and International Courts: The Politics of Judicial Appointment at the World Trade 
Organization, 19 EUR. J. INT’L REL. (forthcoming 2013) (detailing the 
politicization of judicial nominations and appointments to the World Trade 
Organization’s Appellate Body). 
 171. Alter, Agents or Trustees?, supra note 35, at 35 (observing that 
international judge appointments are less politicized because such appointments 
require cooperation from multiple Member States). 
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does French President Charles de Gaulle’s puzzling and highly 
consequential nomination of the federalist Robert Lecourt, but even 
here Rasmussen could argue that the true influence of the Court was 
not, at that stage, clear to the General.172 What could seem an 
understandable oversight in 1962, however, would become puzzling 
after 1963 and 1964, when the true stakes of European judicial 
appointments had become clear. Is it indeed the case that EU 
Member States have deliberately eschewed the opportunity to 
influence the preferences of the Court through the appointment 
process, opting instead to use judicial appointments for relatively 
trivial ends such as patronage appointments? Or have at least some 
Member States made concerted efforts to use the appointment 
process to introduce particular judicial views or temperaments—pro-
integration, anti-integration, or otherwise—into the Court? Once 
again, this is a subject about which we know too little, and where 
historians could fill the gap.  
D. THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL DISSENT 
A final question has to do with the internal life of the Court and, in 
particular, with the lack of any openly dissenting votes or opinions 
by judges of the ECJ or of the contemporary General Court 
(previously, the Court of First Instance). Among scholars of 
European legal integration, it is often taken as a given that an 
international court of uncertain legitimacy should stifle dissent and 
present a unified face to the world to protect the judges’ 
independence and the Court’s legitimacy.173 However, as Jeffrey 
Dunoff and I have discovered in an ongoing comparative study of 
 
 172. Rasmussen, Establishing a Constitutional Practice of European Law, supra 
note 11, at 389 (observing that the Lecourt’s nomination was a “personal favour to 
a friend . . . but also reflects how little influence the . . . French leaders believed the 
ECJ to have”). 
 173. See, e.g., DANIEL TERRIS ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL JUDGE: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE MEN AND WOMEN WHO DECIDE THE WORLD’S CASES 125 
(2007) (noting that in the context of international criminal courts, allowing dissent 
threatens the perception that the accused was guilty beyond reasonable doubt); 
Julia Laffranque, Dissenting Opinion in the European Court of Justice — Estonia’s 
Possible Contribution to the Democratisation of the European Union Judicial 
System, 9 JURIDICA INT’L 14, 16–17 (2004) (noting that the tradition of per curiam 
decisions without dissent is embedded in continental European law, unlike British 
legal traditions); Mattli & Slaughter, supra note 52, at 181–82 (observing that a 
dissent-free practice conceals the reasoning of individual judges). 
  
1308 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [28:5 
international judicial dissent, the ECJ is an outlier among 
international courts in this regard: most other international courts 
both allow and regularly engage in dissents, with judges voting 
openly and issuing both concurring and dissenting opinions 
alongside the judgment of the Court.174  
Among existing international courts, the Appellate Body of the 
World Trade Organization (“WTO”) initially followed the lead of the 
ECJ in suppressing dissents, not least because the WTO’s Dispute 
Settlement Understanding provides explicitly that votes of the 
Appellate Body shall be anonymous.175 The Appellate Body’s 
Working Procedures discourage even internal dissents, calling upon 
its members to make “every effort to take their decisions by 
consensus,” even where decisions can be taken by a majority vote.176 
Over the course of its first decade and a half of operation, however, 
the Appellate Body has gradually departed from this norm, engaging 
in a small number of anonymous dissents on individual points within 
the body of Appellate Body decisions.177 This practice has been 
controversial among observers of the WTO, but proponents argue 
that after fifteen years the Court is now sufficiently well established 
and legitimate to allow for public dissent.178 The case for dissents is 
 
 174. Jeffrey A. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack, International Judicial Dissent: 
Causes and Consequences 19–20 (Oct. 19–20, 2012) (unpublished manuscript 
presented at the Princeton University Conference on Judicial Institutions: Courts in 
Domestic & International Affairs) (on file with the American University 
International Law Review and the author); see also Mark A. Pollack, Research 
Frontiers in International Judicial Independence: Judicial Appointment and 
Dissent, in COURTS, SOCIAL CHANGE, AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 57, 59–60 
(Adriana Silvia Dreyzin de Klor et al. eds., 2012) (comparing the lack of dissents 
in the ECJ to other international courts such as the International Court of Justice 
and the European Court on Human Rights, which have taken to issuing concurring 
and dissenting opinions). 
 175. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes art. 14, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 (“Opinions expressed in the 
panel report by individual panelists shall be anonymous.”). 
 176. Id. art. 3.2. 
 177. See Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The Lack of Dissent in WTO Dispute 
Settlement, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L. 895, 895 (2006) (noting that “[f]ewer than 5% of 
panel reports and 2% of Appellate Body reports contain separate opinions of any 
kind” and arguing that dissents have value and their use should be increased). 
 178. See id. at 930 (arguing there is a “benefit from having serious differences of 
opinion or interpretation made transparent. Members would then have the 
opportunity to consider the competing views and to determine whether the 
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further strengthened by the practice of another European court, the 
European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”), whose widespread use 
of concurring and dissenting opinions is widely seen as consistent 
with both judicial independence and a high level of legitimacy—
although here it is striking that the Member States of the ECtHR 
have reformed the court to provide for nine-year, non-renewable 
terms of office for ECtHR judges, who had previously served 
renewable six-year terms like their ECJ counterparts.179 
As with so many other questions about the internal workings of 
the Court, we know very little about dissent in the ECJ, including 
how frequently the judges are able to achieve consensus as opposed 
to deciding by majority vote, as well as whether the judges have ever 
seriously considered engaging in public dissents similar to the 
anonymous dissents of the WTO Appellate Body. Given the strict 
norms of secrecy about the deliberations of the Court, it is unlikely 
that serving members of the ECJ or other European Courts can or 
will shed any light on this question with respect to today’s Court, but 
we can hope that archival materials from the early years of the ECJ 
may shed light on these and other questions. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
In this essay, I cannot claim to have comprehensively reviewed the 
findings of the New EU Legal History. Instead, I have pursued a 
more parochial aim, to establish the “value added” of this new 
scholarship, assessing what is new and what it still missing in this 
work, measured against the baseline of sophisticated existing 
literatures in political science and law. Having identified four major 
questions that have informed the political science scholarship on the 
 
majority interpretation is the preferred outcome”). But see James Flett, Collective 
Intelligence and the Possibility of Dissent: Anonymous Individual Opinions in 
WTO Jurisprudence, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 287, 320 (2010) (preferring the “view 
that the system can and should generally expect individual panelists to find 
common ground, just as the negotiators must have managed to find common 
ground when they framed the treaty”). 
 179. Pollack, supra note 174, at 60; see also Erik Voeten, The Impartiality of 
International Judges: Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights, 102 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 417, 418–421 (2008) (remarking that the adoption of nine-year 
terms would likely boost judicial independence and impartiality by addressing the 
“possibility of removal combined with the dependence on national governments 
for other prestigious positions”). 
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ECJ—the nature and preferences of the court, its independence from 
its Member States, its relationship with national Courts, and its role 
in the “constitutionalization” of the treaties—I have indeed found 
significant value-added in the findings of EU legal historians, who 
have qualified existing assumptions and provided evidence to help 
adjudicate long-standing debates about the ECJ among political 
scientists and legal scholars.  
In terms of the nature of the Court and its preferences, historians 
have challenged the complacent assumptions about the unity and the 
pro-integration preferences of the Court, showing us instead an early 
Court that was divided in its views and whose judges were far from 
consistently “constitutional” in their preferences. With respect to the 
independence of the Court, we have seen that ECJ judges did indeed 
pursue a gradual process of “constitutionalizing” the treaties against 
the expressed will of several Member States, counter to the 
predictions of a simple intergovernmentalist model, although we 
have also seen that they were more cautious, and more acutely aware 
of the potential for backlash, than a strong “trusteeship” image might 
imply. In terms of the Court’s relations with national courts, 
historical studies have reinforced the findings of recent political 
science scholarship, which finds numerous examples of consistent, 
sustained resistance to the ECJ from some national courts, whose 
reception in the Member States’ legal orders is indeed the 
“patchwork” depicted by Davies. Finally, all of these findings taken 
together yield a picture of an ECJ whose constitutionalization of the 
treaties was indeed an act of agency, but a more contingent and more 
contested act than the heroic accounts of this period have suggested 
until now.  
There remain, to be sure, many questions still to be answered 
about the Court, and I have identified above only a handful of such 
questions that are particularly interesting to me as a political 
scientist. Happily, the New EU Legal History remains in its infancy, 
and we can therefore look forward to the Court surrendering more of 
its secrets under the sustained gaze of a new generation of legal 
historians.  
 
